The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism by LeDuc, André
Washington University Jurisprudence Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2
2015
The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over
Originalism
André LeDuc
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Epistemology Commons, History of Philosophy
Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Theory
Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Rule of Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 263 (2015).
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
263 
THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 
ANDRÉ LEDUC

 
ABSTRACT 
Because the participants in the debate over constitutional originalism 
generally understand the controversy to be over a matter of the objective 
truth of competing interpretations of the Constitution, they do not believe 
that their mission is to persuade the other side. When what is at stake is a 
matter of objective truth, subjective opinions are of less moment. 
This Article begins the long overdue transcendence of our increasingly 
fruitless and acrimonious debate over originalism by articulating the tacit 
philosophical premises that make the debate possible. It demonstrates that 
originalism, despite its pretensions to common sense and its disavowal of 
abstruse philosophical analysis, is tacitly committed to three key 
ontological and linguistic premises. First, language represents the world. 
Second, propositions or statements are true if they accurately (truly) 
represent that world. Thus, propositions of constitutional law represent 
the constitutional world. As a consequence, propositions or statements of 
constitutional law are true if they accurately (truly) represent that 
constitutional world. Third, there is an ontologically independent 
Constitution that our constitutional interpretation describes. For the 
originalist, that objective Constitution is the semantic understanding of the 
constitutional provisions when they were originally adopted or amended. 
Moreover, surprisingly, originalism’s critics are also committed to these 
same premises about the nature of language, the nature of truth and the 
existence of an objective Constitution. Originalism’s critics assert that the 
objective Constitution has sources beyond the original understanding of 
its provisions. 
These shared premises about the nature of language and the nature of 
the Constitution permit the debate over originalism to proceed as a debate 
about the objective truth of constitutional interpretations and the accuracy 
of each side’s description of the objective facts about the Constitution. 
Because both sides of the debate believe there to be an objective answer to 
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the questions they address, the debate can focus upon defending the 
account of the relevant interpretation rather than on persuading the other 
side. Understanding that fundamental dynamic to the debate helps explain 
why it has been so unproductive. Moreover, understanding that the debate 
over originalism is only possible if these premises are true highlights the 
underlying question whether such premises are indeed correct. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEBATE 
OVER ORIGINALISM 
Given the proudly unphilosophical tenor of originalism, it may appear 
more than a little implausible to offer an account of the ontological 
foundations of originalism and the originalism debate. This Article will 
nevertheless establish those foundations, without projecting back a set of 
theoretical or conceptual commitments that the originalists would 
themselves disavow—even if they may not have been fully mindful of 
their conceptual commitments. Just as surprising, this Article will show 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/7
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that certain key assumptions are shared by originalism’s critics, and that 
those shared assumptions make the originalism debate possible.
1
 The 
ontological foundations and other shared philosophical assumptions 
underlying the debate over originalism have received little attention.
2
 The 
importance of these philosophical dimensions is neither widely 
acknowledged
3
 nor uncontroversial.
4
 At least one leading American legal 
philosopher has denied that philosophical premises underlie such debates.
5
 
After exploring the disparate commitments originalism and its critics 
make, expressly or implicitly, with respect to these questions, I will 
demonstrate why those commitments are fundamental to continuing the 
debate over originalism as it has been conducted over the past decades. 
The protagonists’ tacit or express answers to four philosophical 
questions provide the core premises for this analysis. Those questions are: 
(1) what is constitutional law; (2) how is the truth of propositions of 
constitutional law determined; (3) how are propositions of constitutional 
law given meaning; (4) and what is the nature of our disagreements about 
such propositions? Originalism’s theory makes important commitments on 
these issues, but generally does so in an informal, ad hoc way.
6
 The 
 
 
 1.  This claim was made by Philip Bobbitt over thirty years ago, but has played little role in the 
evolution of the debate. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE]. Bobbitt did not offer a systematic defense of this claim, however, 
and it has generally not been accepted by the protagonists in the debate. Moreover, given the range of 
arguments deployed in the debate, including the substantial differences among the protagonists on 
each side, this claim may appear questionable. Indeed, as I will explore below, some of the critics of 
originalism flirt with an anti-foundational account of our constitutional law but ultimately fail to 
appreciate the implications of abandoning their tacit philosophical premises. 
 2. Dworkin is a prominent exception; he recognizes at least some of his commitments, and 
defends them. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 87 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity]; Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 
45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Originalism]. 
 3. Professors Bobbitt and Patterson appear the clearest and largely isolated proponents of this 
view, at least expressly. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 1; DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 
(1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH]. For example, the generally thoughtful and acute Jack Balkin 
apparently missed the central thrust of Bobbitt’s analysis in his discussion of Bobbitt in Living 
Originalism. See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 341–42 n.2 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM] (“My view is slightly different.”). Balkin suggests that Bobbitt chooses conscience as 
the means to pick amongst the outcomes derived from conflicting modalities and then goes on to pick 
originalism as the sole modality that he believes trumps. The core of Bobbitt’s claim is that there can 
be no algorithm or rule by which a resolution of conflict can be determined. See generally BOBBITT, 
FATE, supra note 1. 
 4. See BRIAN LEITER, Why Quine Is Not a Postmodernist, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: 
ESSAYS IN AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 137, 139 n.6 (2007) 
[hereinafter LEITER, Quine] (denying that controversy over judicial review is rooted in a 
representational theory of language or an empirical theory of legal propositions). 
 5. Id. I explore these arguments below at Part II.C. 
 6. Originalism, after all, mocks the notion that philosophical reasoning figures in constitutional 
interpretation. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
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positions are not always articulated and are rarely defended. But I will 
demonstrate that they are adopted implicitly and, more importantly, play 
an important role in originalism’s account. Moreover, these premises are 
shared with many of originalism’s critics. This claim may appear 
particularly surprising since the substance of the opposing positions with 
respect to the Constitution and the proper methods of interpretation of the 
Constitution are so different. 
The reader may understandably think all of this pretty highfalutin, and 
wonder where all of this philosophy may take us. Originalists, in 
particular, may be skeptical. Indeed, the role of philosophical theory in the 
law has been the focus of controversy in the wake of Judge Posner’s 1997 
Holmes Lectures.
7
 In those lectures, Posner attacked the notion that moral 
philosophy had anything to add to law.
8
 That attack was met with a 
vigorous defense.
9
 Although it is safe to say that Posner’s critics had the 
better part of the exchange, I don’t want to re-engage those arguments 
here; I want only to distinguish the kind of philosophical analysis I am 
undertaking here from that criticized by Posner. 
The argument I will advance will be quite different from that made by 
Posner. His argument is an anti-theoretical argument against the kind of 
thinking and analysis that philosophers do.
10
 Posner asserts that such 
analysis and argument is fundamentally confused and ineffectual. That 
 
 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 45–46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION]. Nevertheless, originalism tacitly invokes a range of philosophical 
propositions as foundations or premises. For example, originalism takes for granted the 
commonsensical notion that we know what we are talking about when we talk about the Constitution, 
however much we may disagree about its interpretation. 
 7. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1637 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics]; Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1739 (1998) [hereinafter Fried, Philosophy]; Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 1776 (1998); Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998). 
Although Posner and his critics focused on the role of ethics and moral philosophy in legal theory, 
much of the exchange can be easily translated and applied to the more general questions surrounding 
the role of philosophy in legal theory. 
 8. Posner, Problematics, supra note 7, at 1640 (“I confess to a visceral dislike . . . of academic 
moralism. A lot of it strikes me as prissy, hermetic, censorious, naïve, sanctimonious, self-
congratulatory, too far Left or too far Right, and despite its frequent political extremism, rather 
insipid.”). 
 9. Fried, Philosophy, supra note 7, at 1739 (“There is argument here too, but it is too gross and 
unnuanced to dispose of the arguments [Posner] seeks to refute.”). Posner is tone deaf to important 
elements in many of the philosophical arguments he attacks. That may help explain his claim to 
embrace pragmatism while remaining fundamentally committed to empiricist principles. 
 10. This Article will address only some of the kinds of philosophical premises inherent in 
originalism and in the originalism debate, those relating to ontology and the philosophy of language. 
There are other important premises of political philosophy and from jurisprudence that also warrant 
attention but will not be addressed here. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/7
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claim appears unsubstantiated. The analysis defended here provides a 
counterexample to Posner’s assertion of the unimportance of philosophical 
method. My argument here is that philosophical commitments play an 
often tacit role in constitutional theory and adjudication. In particular, 
shared, erroneous, and confused philosophical premises make the debate 
over originalism possible and, in the eyes of the protagonists, necessary. 
The philosophy of language and ontology can, however, reveal and disarm 
those mistaken philosophical premises implicit in the originalism debate.
11
 
But that therapeutic role for philosophy is quite different from the bolder 
project to derive substantive constitutional conclusions from philosophical 
premises. On this latter point Posner and I are in accord.
12
 
II. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE: ORIGINALISM’S TACIT 
ACCOUNT OF CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTH AND MEANING 
My analysis begins by articulating the fundamental philosophical 
commitments of originalism. Second, I describe the relevant philosophical 
commitments of Ronald Dworkin, one of the leading critics of originalism. 
Articulating the ontological and linguistic philosophical commitments of 
originalism is difficult for two reasons. First, originalism is largely 
untheoretical and, indeed, even sometimes anti-theoretical,
13
 eschewing 
direct attention to these questions. Therefore, teasing out the originalist 
positions is more difficult than with respect to the express claims 
discussed before. Second, these questions, at once practical and 
philosophical, are simply difficult in themselves. The threshold question is 
whether originalism has an ontology or epistemology, a theory of language 
or a theory of truth, and if it does, in what sense is that theory a 
philosophical theory? By philosophical, I mean a functional concept, 
 
 
 11. This strategy is not new; as noted at note 1, supra, it was sketched thirty years ago by Philip 
Bobbitt. But the claim has not been adequately articulated nor has it been generally accepted by either 
camp in the debate. So in addition to proposing therapy, I will be trying to recast Bobbitt’s argument to 
be more persuasive to the protagonists in the debate over originalism. See generally BOBBITT, FATE, 
supra note 1; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
INTERPRETATION]. 
 12. For a more complete account of the relationship of philosophy to constitutional law see 
André LeDuc, The Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: Five Lessons from the 
Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99 (2014).  
 13. See Barnett, Originalism, supra note 2, at 613 (“[Originalism] has prevailed without anyone 
writing a definitive formulation . . . or a definitive refutation of its critics.”). The implications of this 
feature of originalism have received little attention from originalism’s proponents and critics. When 
Barnett reworked this discussion in Restoring the Lost Constitution, he did not include this assessment. 
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 9 
(2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, LOST].  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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defined by reference to the kinds of theories and addressing the kinds of 
subjects that contemporary philosophers advance, defend, and criticize. I 
am here agnostic as to the controversial question whether there are 
fundamental questions that form the subject of philosophy. 
Four questions are key: 
(1) What is constitutional law? 
(2) What is the nature of truth for propositions of constitutional 
law? 
(3) How are constitutional provisions given meaning? 
(4) What is/are the nature(s) of constitutional disagreements and 
arguments? 
The answers to these questions capture the relevant tacit and implicit 
philosophical commitments of originalism and its critics. 
Originalism implicitly commits to the following theses: 
(1) Constitutional law is an objective thing that is defined by a set of 
social practices based upon the original understanding of (or 
intentions and expectations with respect to) the constitutional text. 
(2) Propositions of constitutional law are true if and only if they 
correspond to facts about the original understanding of the 
constitutional text.
14
 
(3) The meaning of constitutional provisions is determined by 
semantics and syntax, the meanings of words and the rules of 
grammar. That meaning is not reducible to use. 
(4) Constitutional disputes are disagreements about the meaning of 
constitutional provisions. The relevant meanings in this context are 
semantic. 
 
 
 14. The pervasiveness of originalism’s realism is confirmed by Scott Soames’s recent work. 
While Soames distinguishes his position from originalism, his views are probably best understood as a 
weak form of originalism. See Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, Deferentialism]. 
Some originalists, notably Robert Bork, also make a modal claim about the truth of originalist 
propositions of constitutional law, but this modal claim is both peripheral to the originalist project and 
implausible. See generally André LeDuc, Originalism’s Implications Section II.E (Oct. 20, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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These four, interrelated positions describe a classic, semantic account of 
constitutional law.
15
 The first claim is an ontological claim.
16
 The second 
claim offers a theory of the truth of propositions of constitutional law. The 
third claim is an account of the meaning of the Constitution. These claims, 
particularly the second and fourth, create the foundation on which the 
classical debate over originalism has been conducted. Without those 
foundations, the debate about originalism, if it survives at all, must be very 
different.
17
 
A. The Nature of Constitutional Law  
The originalist ontological commitment to the status of the Constitution 
as a thing appears so obvious as to be seemingly uncontestable. As a 
threshold matter, the Constitution would appear to be, rather than not to 
be.
18
 Whatever the complexities of being may be,
19
 the Constitution would 
clearly appear to exist. When we are talking about the Constitution, it is 
not like our talk of unicorns.
20
 Even if there may be some questions about 
the nature of the Constitution, most of us are pretty sure that the 
Constitution, unlike unicorns, exists.
21
 Moreover, because of its legal, 
 
 
 15. This can be characterized as a semantic account of law because it limits the meaning of the 
constitutional provisions to their semantic meaning. This claim is similar to, but distinct from, 
Dworkin’s account of semantic theories of law; both emphasize the restriction of law to linguistic 
meaning, and disagreements about law to disagreements about meaning. 
 16. It is an ontological claim because it asserts a proposition about the nature of the thing that is 
the Constitution. 
 17. But see LEITER, Quine, supra note 4, at 139 n.6 (denying that controversy over judicial 
review is rooted in a representational theory of language or an empirical theory of legal propositions, 
but without argument or explanation). 
 18. But see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 183–85 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (effectively reading the Ninth Amendment out of 
the Constitution). 
 19. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME: A TRANSLATION OF SEIN UND ZEIT 
(Joan Stambaugh trans., 1996) (exploring the fundamentality of being as a philosophical question). 
 20. When we talk of unicorns, we talk of something that does not exist or, on one account, 
cannot exist, because they are inherently fictional. As has been remarked, even if we were to encounter 
in some remote location a white quadruped with a single straight horn in the center of its forehead, we 
would not conclude that we had discovered a unicorn. When we talk about the Constitution, we are 
talking about something that contingently exists. 
 21. It is likely that many of the beliefs of American citizens are not true, as in the case of the 
belief that the Constitution is a text in the National Archives. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 64–68 (2012) 
[hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION] (describing the slight textual differences 
between the signed parchment copy of the original, unamended Constitution in the National Archives 
and the original printed edition that was prepared for the ratifying conventions). There is no reason to 
think that those dominant false beliefs compromise the general belief in the existence of the 
Constitution. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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political, and cultural importance, the commitment that has been made to 
the preservation of the authoritative text is extraordinary.
22
 What is the 
Constitution that we are preserving as text, document, and touchstone of 
our constitutional democratic republic? Originalism believes that the law 
of the Constitution is a thing that corresponds to the constitutional lump in 
the National Archives.
23
 Intuitively, that is certainly how we all start out 
thinking about the Constitution. 
Perhaps the best place to see the tacit commitment to the objective 
Constitution is in Justice Scalia’s seminal defense of originalism.24 There 
he writes “[n]othing in the text of the Constitution [creates the right and 
power of judicial review] . . . .”25 The absence of such an express grant of 
the power of judicial review, and the associated power to strike down state 
and federal legislation found to violate constitutional requirements, leads 
Scalia to conclude that such authority must be carefully circumscribed.
26
 
As a result, Scalia charges the courts with identifying a historical meaning 
and a historical understanding of that meaning. Thus, the meaning of the 
Constitution is reduced to a matter of historical fact.
27
 To understand why 
 
 
 22. See Preservation, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/preservation/special-
projects.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
 23. One of the dimensions of law and of legal texts that makes them so complex is that they may 
appear to be at once texts and lumps. For Rorty, of course, there is no question: the Constitution is a 
text: 
[The division between texts and lumps] corresponds roughly to things made and things found. 
Think of a paradigmatic text as something puzzling which was said or written by a member of 
a primitive tribe. . . . Think of a lump as something which you would bring for analysis to a 
natural scientist. . . . A wadded-up plastic bag is a borderline case of a lump. 
See 1 RICHARD RORTY, Texts and Lumps, in OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 78, 84–85 (1991). The claim that legal texts may be viewed as lumpy is implicit in 
originalism. The force of the Constitution to constrain us, to govern us, may appear to give it a place in 
the space of causes, as well as in the space of reasons. What I mean by this claim is that as a 
performative written utterance, the Constitution not only admits of interpretation, operating in the 
space of reasons, but it also constrains those of us in the political community that it governs, thus 
acting in the space of causes and actions. That is to say, law is a means by which power is channeled 
and deployed within our society, and it shapes our behavior even if it does not always give us reasons 
in the strong sense of convincing us as rational actors of the propriety of the course we must follow. 
Law operates on us, together with the social practices that incorporate it, explicate it, and implement it, 
in a manner seemingly not entirely dissimilar to the way Mt. Everest constrains the bar-headed geese. 
See Section III.A, infra. In an important sense, understanding the textuality of the Constitution, and its 
status as a social artifact rather than as a lump, is the task of this article and of André LeDuc, The Anti-
Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119 PENN. ST. 
L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge]. 
 24. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989). 
 25. Id. (arguing from the absence of express constitutional provision for judicial review that only 
originalism provides an interpretation of the Constitution consistent with such judicial review). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 856–57. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/7
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Justice Scalia’s commitment is ontological in nature, it is important to 
recognize that he believes that he is simply treating the text of the 
Constitution like any other text.
28
 He believes, by contrast, that 
originalism’s critics are treating the Constitution as an unusual type of 
text.
29
 According to Justice Scalia, these critics, like Tribe and Dworkin, 
are willing to ride roughshod over the fixed meaning of the constitutional 
text in the service of their political goals.
30
 Scalia thus believes that all 
texts, not just the Constitution, have such a fixed meaning that 
constitutional interpretation identifies and applies to particular questions 
or disputes.
31
 They have that meaning under a particular theory of 
language, including a theory of meaning and a theory of truth. Those 
premises are tacitly invoked in Scalia’s rejection of originalism’s critics’ 
claim that the Constitution can best be interpreted to take into account a 
whole array of arguments foreclosed by originalism. 
Other originalists are also committed to the objective existence of the 
Constitution and its status as an ontologically independent entity. In the 
case of Judge Bork, at least in his later writings, the commitment is even 
more fundamental.
32
 Bork believes that the very nature of a constitution is 
to be fixed, and the purpose of a constitution is to restrict or preclude 
change.
33
 Later originalists have maintained these ontological 
commitments
34—for example, Barnett begins his account of the 
Constitution: “The Constitution of the United States is a piece of 
parchment under glass in Washington, D.C.”35 Thus, Barnett’s account 
 
 
 28. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 46. See also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 
164 (contrasting doubts about our ability to ascertain the meaning of constitutional provisions with our 
approach to other texts). 
 29. Id. Elsewhere Justice Scalia himself characterizes the constitutional text as unusual, but in 
that context the claim appears only to mean that the constitutional text is different from a statutory 
text. Id. at 37. 
 30. Id. at 38–39. 
 31. Id. at 38 (asserting that the principles of constitutional interpretation are the same as those for 
statutory interpretation). 
 32. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 143–44 (“When we speak of ‘law’ we ordinarily refer to 
a rule that we have no right to change except through prescribed procedures.”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Recently, in his novel and thoughtful articulation and defense of originalism as a theory of 
change (or lack thereof) for positive law, Stephen Sachs also appears to accept the premise of an 
independent, objective Constitution. This is made apparent in Sachs’s claim that “[o]riginal-law 
originalism is extremely demanding from a historical perspective: there’s just an awful lot we need to 
know.” Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, __ HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y __ 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498838## [hereinafter 
Sachs, Legal Change]. 
 35. BARNETT, LOST, supra note 13, at 9; but see AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 21, at 64–68. 
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privileges the constitutional lump, not the constitutional text.
36
 For 
Barnett, as for Scalia and Bork, the independent existence of the 
Constitution is the bedrock upon which the originalist project is grounded. 
Other more canonical originalists share the commitment to the 
independent existence of the Constitution.
37
 
Because the existence of the Constitution may appear so obvious and 
because it is so often taken for granted, it may not be apparent what the 
alternative would be to asserting the independent ontological existence of 
the Constitution. One possibility, of course, would be that in the absence 
of an independent Constitution we have nothing. This is sometimes 
suggested by originalists in defending originalism’s claims.38 But there is 
another possibility besides lawlessness. Our Constitution might consist, 
fundamentally, simply in our practices.
39
 The relevant practices and the 
relevant practitioners can, on this account, be defined with sufficient 
precision for this notion to be meaningful. The most important 
practitioners are the current members of the Supreme Court and, to a lesser 
extent, the judges of the lower federal courts and the state courts. 
Constitutional advocates who appear before such courts and make 
arguments would also appear relevant participants, as would academic and 
other commentators.
40
 This does not generate a precise definition of the 
 
 
 36. See RORTY, Texts and Lumps, supra note 23, at 84–5.  
 37. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 56 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION] (“The constitutional constraint on the people’s agents can emerge from the text as 
intended, however, only if the text has the fixed meaning it is uniquely capable of carrying.”). This 
claim appears overstated; even if the text does not carry a unique meaning it could act as a constraint 
upon judicial decision makers. Scott Soames recognizes the manifold sources of linguistic ambiguity 
in constructing his originalist account of legal interpretation. See generally Soames, Deferentialism, 
supra note 14. 
 38. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 47 (“By trying to make the Constitution do 
everything that needs doing from age to age, we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.”). Other non-
originalists have made similar arguments against interpretative methodologies that permit external 
values to inform interpretation. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as Mirror: Tribe’s 
Constitutional Choices, 84 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1986) (reviewing Laurence Tribe’s Constitutional 
Choices). 
 39. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at xiv–xv, xv (“So constitutional 
interpretation is not indeterminate even though it does not always yield unique answers.”); 24 (“Law is 
something we do, not something we have as a consequence of something we do.”); BOBBITT, FATE, 
supra note 1, at 5. See also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 3, at 151–63. I do not want to defend this 
characterization of the Constitution here; I want only to sketch out what such a characterization might 
look like to set the context for discussion in the text as to whether there is a commitment by the 
various protagonists in the debate over originalism to an ontologically independent Constitution. For 
an examination of such an account more generally see LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra 
note 23. 
 40. Such commentators would appear relevant only to the extent that they are addressing 
constitutional interpretation and decision from within the modalities of constitutional argument. 
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relevant community, but it is not apparent that a precise definition is 
required. The relevant practices would be the decision of constitutional 
cases, the reasoning and argument for such decisional outcomes, and the 
analysis and assessment of such decisions and arguments.
41
 The claim of 
such a characterization of our Constitution is that these practices are 
sufficiently well defined as to make the concept of the Constitution 
meaningful and useful. As with the definition of the relevant community, 
the definition of the relevant practices is admittedly vague, but seemingly 
sufficient. 
Even if originalists are generally committed to the existence of the 
Constitution independent of our practices of constitutional argument and 
decision, it may not be immediately clear whether this commitment has 
any meaningful consequences with respect to the originalist claims or with 
respect to the originalism debate. How does the originalists’ ontological 
commitment to the existence of the Constitution shape the defense of 
originalism against its critics? 
The objective, independent Constitution of originalism is fixed and 
unchanging.
42
 As such, it is contrasted with our social and legal practices, 
which have changed and will continue to change over time as our political 
choices evolve in our democratic republic.
43
 Thus, the fundamental 
consequence for the originalism debate of the ontological commitment to 
an independent Constitution is that it rebuts the claim of originalism’s 
critics that the original intentions, understandings, and meanings are not 
dispositive in constitutional interpretation and decision. If such originalist 
foundations are not dispositive, then there is the possibility of flux in our 
constitutional interpretation and decision—flux that the originalists reject. 
From the objective existence of the Constitution four further premises 
may be derived. First, if the Constitution has an independent objective 
existence, then it may appear more plausible to interpret it as a text 
consisting of declarative statements. That is because in its objective, 
independent existence it is more easily divorced from its functional, 
performative role in our social and political practices. Second, it is natural 
 
 
Sociological or political analysis of decision would not appear to fall within the ambit of the relevant 
practices. 
 41. Constitutional amendments, and the arguments for and against such amendments, would also 
appear part of the relevant practices. 
 42. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 47 (lamenting the passing of the day 
when “[W]e believed firmly enough in a rock-solid, unchanging Constitution that [we thought change 
could only come through amendment, as in the case of the 19th Amendment guaranteeing] women the 
vote.”). 
 43. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
274 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:263 
 
 
 
 
to continue to think that constitutional law is a set of legal propositions, 
the truth of which is a matter of correspondence with the constitutional 
text. Third, this model of the Constitution provides a more plausible 
account of constitutional argument and decision that is based upon 
knowing the relevant constitutional truths, rather than, for example, 
choosing outcomes as a matter of our constitutional practice. Fourth, if our 
constitutional decision is a matter of knowing objective propositions of 
constitutional law, then constitutional argument consists of arguments 
about the truth of such propositions. The commitment to the Constitution 
itself is thus an important building block for the balance of the even more 
important, and controversial, originalist claims. 
B. The Truth of Propositions of Constitutional Law 
Only propositions about the Constitution that state propositions of law 
are examined here.
44
 Originalists believe that the truth of such propositions 
is not a theoretically difficult or complex topic. The nature of the truth of 
such propositions is not unlike the way we understand the truth of legal 
propositions generally. As a matter of common sense we all think that we 
know what makes legal propositions true; the uncertainty relates to 
whether particular legal propositions are true. We generally know what 
would make X a murderer even when we don’t know whether X is a 
murderer. He would be a murderer, and it would be true to assert the 
proposition “X is a murderer” if X had intentionally killed another human 
being without defense or excuse.  
Originalism employs this commonsensical view to support a claim that 
interpretive legal propositions about the Constitution are true if the 
original understandings or semantic intentions with respect to the 
Constitution were implied by, or themselves imply, the truth of such 
claim. Thus, for example, the proposition that the Fourth Amendment 
precludes warrantless wiretaps is true if, and only if, the original 
understandings, intentions, or expectations were that warrants were 
 
 
 44. Examples are common, and would include: the First Amendment precludes content-based 
regulation of broadcast television beyond protecting public decency; the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
the Federal Government from conducting warrantless wiretaps of telephones; the Second Amendment 
prohibits prohibitions on the ownership of handguns by the federal government; and the Constitution 
requires the President of the United States to be at least 35 years old when he assumes office. While 
other kinds of statements may be made about the Constitution, I will not be concerned with 
propositions about the literary style of the Constitution, its political theory, or its economic 
foundations, for example. 
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required for such wiretaps. While largely commonsensical,
45
 such claims 
may not be a complete or satisfactory account.
46
 An alternative, 
pragmatist, inferentialist account would turn the focus from truth 
conditions and correspondence with an external objective world to the role 
such propositions of constitutional law play in our discursive practices and 
in our social and political practices as well.
47
 
For the originalist, the truth of such propositions can be determined by 
a careful, historical reading of the Constitution that looks to the 
understanding and semantic or outcome expectations with respect thereto, 
and the associated intentions on adoption or amendment, as the case may 
be.
48
 The originalists do not often speak expressly in terms of the truth of 
propositions of constitutional law. Instead, they describe the correct or 
proper interpretation or meaning of the Constitution.
49
 The originalists’ 
approach to the meaning of the Constitution and their relative indifference 
to the truth of propositions of constitutional law may appear to be some 
evidence for the deflationary accounts of truth.
50
 The originalists defend 
their account of constitutional interpretation without much need to 
articulate an express theory of the truth of propositions of constitutional 
law. 
 
 
 45. The account appears commonsensical because it is the way we ordinarily speak about others’ 
utterances. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA 57 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ROBES] (describing the task of interpreting a 
friend’s request for a musical recording when buying a birthday present for a friend who likes the 
music of Barbra Streisand). 
 46. The principal objection to this account is offered by Bobbitt and Patterson. See BOBBITT, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at xii–xiv; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 1, at 4–7; PATTERSON, TRUTH, 
supra note 3, at 151–63. Most simply, they deny that we have an objective Constitution that is 
ontologically or epistemologically independent of our practices of constitutional law to which an 
appeal can be made to test the truth of propositions of constitutional law. Id. 
 47. See also ROBERT BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INFERENTIALISM (2000) (describing how an inferentialist account of propositions that focuses upon the 
use of propositions in making inferences and stating the consequences of inferences can provide an 
alternative, pragmatist account of language and meaning without reference to representational 
concepts); ROBERT BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE 
COMMITMENT (1994). 
 48. Originalism is clear that adoption or amendment determines the time at which the 
understanding, expectations, or intentions are controlling. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–69 (2d ed. 1997). 
 49. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 3 (“[T]he Constitution is the trump card in 
American politics, and judges decide what the Constitution means.”); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 6, at 37 (“I wish to address a final subject: the distinctive problem of constitutional 
interpretation.”). 
 50. See, e.g., PAUL HORWICH, The Minimalist Conception of Truth, in TRUTH 239 (Simon 
Blackburn & Keith Simmons eds., 1999) (defense of a deflationary account of truth). That lack of 
attention suggests that truth may be a less important concept in the context of constitutional law. 
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But originalists are committed to the proposition that there is a truth-
value for propositions of constitutional law based upon an historical fact of 
the matter. What infuriated originalists, originally, with respect to the 
decisions and opinions of the Warren Court was precisely that indifference 
to such historical facts of the matter.
51
 They continue to be offended, 
indeed, outraged, by the proponents of the living Constitution who deny 
the relationship of the truth of propositions of constitutional law to those 
facts identified in the originalist account, while nevertheless generally 
taking as a given that there is a historical fact of the matter, in the 
objective world, about the truth of such propositions.
52
 
It is important to recognize the ahistorical nature of the originalist 
account of the historical truths of constitutional meaning, and the 
implications of that ahistoricity for the originalist project. The notion of an 
unchanging historical fact about the meaning of the Constitution is the 
foundation for the originalist appeal to such meanings to resolve 
constitutional disputes.
53
 The originalists take for granted that this project 
is consistent with the practice of historians.
54
 The historians who have 
questioned this premise have, to a very large degree, merely challenged 
such an approach at the margin.
55
 Those critics have assumed that the 
 
 
 51. Cass Sunstein captures this intensity when he describes the originalists as treating their critics 
as lawless. SUNSTEIN, ROBES, supra note 45, at 54. 
 52. The existence of such a corresponding fact of the matter with respect to propositions of 
constitutional law lays the foundation for the originalist approach to judicial review. For the 
originalist, the role of the constitutional judge is to determine the fact of the matter with respect to 
propositions of constitutional law and then apply those facts to determine whether a given state action 
conforms to those relevant constitutional facts. Any broader or different role for judges in 
constitutional adjudication is anti-democratic and unfounded. This is the sense in which the 
foundational, representational account of constitutional law embedded in the originalist theory grounds 
and engenders the originalist account of judicial review, and the concern that a different account of 
judicial review subverts our Republic’s democracy. 
 53. Thus, the core of the originalist project is that there is an unchanging, ahistorical truth as to 
the interpretation and meaning of the Constitution that can be discovered. See, e.g., SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 40–41; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 161–70. 
 54. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 161–67; Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 
24, at 856–57. 
 55. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (1997) (writing over 30 years after Wofford and Kelly, Kalman concludes 
that the Court had continued to write bad legal history, overstating its conclusions and presuming that 
the questions it faces have historical answers); Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical 
Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437 (1996) (arguing by example for the indeterminacy of 
historical evidence with respect to constitutional questions); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An 
Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 147–49 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of history is 
not strong as measured by the standards of professional historiography, because it is constrained by the 
adjudicative context within which such history is written; note this criticism pre-dates the use of 
history in modern originalism); John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964). 
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historical project undertaken by the originalists is coherent, and only 
suffers from excessive ambitions and unrealistic optimism about the 
ability of such a historical inquiry to secure answers.
56
 Historians may 
choose their lines of inquiry; lawyers and judges are handed their 
historical inquiries by the cases at hand.
57
 Historians generally do not 
believe that the courts (or legal scholars generally) have done a 
distinguished job in their inquiry, whether committed to conservative or 
liberal agendas.
58
 That critical historical literature, much of which pre-
dates the rise of modern originalism, has gone largely unacknowledged by 
the originalists, and its criticisms unanswered.  
Originalism makes two principal arguments for a preeminent role for 
historical argument. The first is simply an optimistic denial, the assertion, 
without more, that history can provide the answers.
59
 That response, in the 
face of the historians’ criticism, as well as the record of legal scholars’ 
consistent failure to get the history right, seems easily dismissed. The 
second, more interesting argument, is that there is no alternative.
60
 On this 
account, we must turn to history, because we have no alternative method. 
This, I think, is a variant of the argument of necessity, discussed below, 
and is no more plausible.
61
 In short, it is certainly not clear that historical 
research can provide a meaningful constraint on the decision of the hard 
constitutional questions facing the Court. Those questions pose a serious 
challenge to the originalist project, but there are even more fundamental 
concerns. 
More importantly, and more fundamentally, there are serious reasons to 
question whether the originalist project is a coherent strategy. The 
originalist premise of an unchanging Constitution is an ahistorical claim. 
Such a claim is inconsistent with ordinary historical understandings.
62
 That 
is because, as our own history continues to unfold, the significance of past 
 
 
 56. As David Strauss and others have pointed out, the historical research skills required by 
originalism go well beyond those necessary for mere history. Most simply, that is because adjudication 
presents questions that cannot be avoided and that uniformly require definitive answers. Historians get 
to pick their questions and need only produce the best history that the evidence will support. See 
DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18–20 (2010). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See sources cited supra note 55. 
 59. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45. 
 60. See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 251–59, 259 (“No matter how tirelessly and 
ingeniously the theorists of constitutional revisionism labor, they will never succeed in making the 
results of their endeavors legitimate as constitutional law.”). 
 61. See infra Part II.D. 
 62. This argument draws heavily from the argument and analysis offered by Arthur Danto. See 
ARTHUR C. DANTO, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (1968) (arguing, among other things, that 
there can be no end of history, because our historical accounts are shaped by our evolving experience). 
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events may change, and our understanding of the significant causes in the 
chain of our prior history may evolve.
63
 Thus, there can be no final 
historical account of the past.
64
 Even if this claim is admitted, however, it 
might be argued that there can be a definitive, final account of a particular 
narrow factual event like the meaning of a particular constitutional 
provision at the time of its adoption. Put another way, what could happen 
that could change how we would describe how a particular provision of 
the Constitution was understood on adoption? 
Such a challenge may be grounded on traditional empiricist 
assumptions (and vestigial intuitions) about knowledge and language.
65
 
Implicit in the challenge is the premise that there are foundational facts 
about the world that are independent of the rest of our language and 
experience. That empiricist premise has been challenged in a variety of 
ways over the past half-century or so, however.
66
 Based upon our 
surviving or vestigial empiricist intuitions, it might appear that whatever 
else may change, we know that the guarantee of the Seventh Amendment 
to a jury trial for suits in which the amount in controversy exceeds twenty 
dollars is certain. But in an inflationary (or a hypothetical deflationary) 
world, is that guarantee based upon the nominal amount of twenty dollars, 
or based upon the purchasing power of twenty dollars in 1791?
67
 On 
reflection, perhaps none of what we now think we know, and certainly 
 
 
 63. This is captured by the perhaps apocryphal story of the exchange between Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and Chinese Premier Cho En Lai. When Kissinger asked whether Cho thought that 
the French Revolution was the seminal event in modern European history, Cho allegedly replied “It’s 
too soon to tell.” 
 64. DANTO, supra note 62, at 14–16. 
 65. Such theories claim that propositions have truth conditions that can be reduced to 
descriptions of experiences of the world. That claim has largely been rejected in contemporary 
philosophy of language. See, e.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960). 
 66. See, e.g., 3 RICHARD RORTY, The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John 
McDowell’s Version of Empiricism, in TRUTH AND PROGRESS 138 (1998) (denying that there is any 
philosophically helpful way of thinking that our language answers to the world); RICHARD RORTY, The 
World Well Lost, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 3 (1982) (exploring how the concept of 
alternative conceptual frameworks commits us to a Kantian metaphysics that ought to be rejected in 
favor of a fully contingent, historicist account); DONALD DAVIDSON, Reality Without Reference, in 
INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 215 (2001); WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND 
OBJECT (1960); WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, reprinted in FROM A 
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (2d ed., rev. 1980) (1953) (arguing against the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic truth and against the claim that the meaning of propositions or sentences can be 
reduced to an account of sense data); WILFRID SELLARS, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 
reprinted in SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY 127 (1963) (arguing against the empiricist claim that 
experience provides us with the given, upon which concepts and reasoning act). 
 67. See generally Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665 (2005) (exploring 
the uncertain meaning and purpose of the guarantee of a civil jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment). 
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none of what we believe, about the Constitution is free from the potential 
for change.
68
 
C. The Meaning of the Constitution 
The originalists’ analysis of constitutional meaning is more fully 
articulated than is their analysis of constitutional truth. Thus, for example, 
Justice Scalia writes:  
. . . the Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is 
not that between the Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but 
rather that between original meaning (whether derived from 
Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.69 
This is a bit misleading, because originalists assert that the original 
meaning is the current meaning.
70
 What Justice Scalia means to say here is 
that there is a divide between those who would interpret or apply the 
Constitution—and this difference may be very important—between those 
who are originalists, believing themselves to be bound by the original 
meaning, and those who consult the original meaning along with other 
authoritative sources of law in determining the current meaning of the 
Constitution in the adjudication of current constitutional disputes.
71
 Thus, 
originalists believe that originalism provides a guide to the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
The originalist account of the Constitution is based on a theory of 
linguistic meaning. In Evolving Originalism,
72
 I outlined an interpretation 
of Justice Scalia’s originalism that emphasized the role of implicature in 
his interpretation of the constitutional text.
73
 The use of implicature is 
fundamentally inconsistent with a picture theory of language. It is 
 
 
 68. For the presentation of just such an account of how we might come to eliminate the mind-
body dualism of classical western philosophy, see Richard Rorty, In Defense of Eliminative 
Materialism, 24 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 112 (1970); Richard Rorty, Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and 
Categories, 19 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 24 (1965). 
 69. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 38. 
 70. Thus, when Justice Scalia refers to current meaning, he does not mean the current meaning of 
the constitutional text. Rather, he refers to the meaning of a hypothetical similar text created in the 
present under contemporary meanings and use. 
 71. Similarly, Bork writes: “What is the meaning of a rule that the judges should not change? It 
is the meaning understood at the time of the [Constitution’s adoption].” BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 
18, at 144. 
 72. André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: What’s Privileged? (Jan. 11, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Evolving Originalism]. 
 73. See generally id. 
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inconsistent because implicature is very largely contextual;
74
 the 
implications of, or inferences properly drawn from, a statement depend 
very largely upon the context in which it is made and the intent with which 
it is uttered or written.
75
 No theory of the meaning of the words of a 
statement as picturing the world can capture this fundamental dimension 
of its use.
76
 
Attention to semantic and pragmatic implicature reveals a couple of 
examples of hidden semantic uncertainty unacknowledged by the 
originalists. These are examples selected by Justice Scalia of transparent 
and unambiguous constitutional language.
77
 Justice Scalia has often 
discussed, both in his commentary
78
 and in his opinions,
79
 the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment which provides, in relevant 
part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”80 In discussing this 
provision, Justice Scalia asserts that the right to be confronted with 
witnesses also includes the right to confront such witnesses; indeed, he 
overlooks or ignores the distinction.
81
 When one is confronted with 
witnesses, one is faced with identified individuals and their testimony 
heard. An accused then has the right to rebut such witnesses and their 
testimony. Among other things, this requirement prohibits secret 
witnesses. When one confronts witnesses, one cross-examines them with 
the ability to impeach them or otherwise challenge their credibility. The 
two rights are clearly related, but the transitive and intransitive forms of 
the verb, “to confront” and “to be confronted with” are clearly distinct. 
 
 
 74. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26–31 (1989) (articulating the rules of 
conversational implicature that inform our ordinary discourse). 
 75. See id. 
 76. A picture theory of meaning cannot capture this functional account of language because uses 
of words change based upon their context; in a sense, the picture would always be changing. Thus, a 
picture theory cannot capture this complexity any more than the account of language in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus can capture the richness of language described in his Philosophical Investigations. 
 77. For example, in defending his view of the confrontation clause, Justice Scalia has written: 
“[t]here is no doubt what confrontation meant—or indeed means today.” SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 6, at 43.  
 78. Id. at 43–44. Justice Scalia has emphasized that to expand the scope of the Amendment 
works to protect the defendant class at the cost of the victims and society, and to narrow the scope of 
the Amendment is to broaden the rights of victims and society at the expense of the defendant 
population. There is not a reading of the Amendment that expands rights and freedom per se. 
 79. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (here, too, Justice Scalia, in this case writing for the Court appears to 
completely gloss over—or overlook—the difference between the passive and active voices, 
interpreting the passive voice of the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause as if it were active). 
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 81. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 43–44. 
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Justice Scalia reads the express provision of the right of a criminal 
defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him as creating an 
implication that such a defendant also has the right to confront such 
witnesses. That is a natural enough implication. Why require that a 
criminal defendant be confronted with witnesses against him without also 
giving him the right to impeach them by confrontation? In most situations, 
that argument seems powerful. The second right supplements and 
enhances the first, and together they help assure the criminal defendant of 
a fair trial.  
In the case of child abuse cases, however, the situation is more 
complex. In the case Justice Scalia addressed, the accused was confronted 
by the witnesses but was, arguably, denied the right to confront them.
82
 
The express right of the Sixth Amendment to be confronted with witnesses 
imposes no severe cost on such child witnesses. Children can be protected 
by the justice system while giving the defendant the benefit of knowing 
the testimony against him. But the right to confront such witnesses 
imposes real costs. Children are more easily intimidated than adults, and 
our contemporary society recognizes a duty to protect them from certain 
unsavory elements of adult life.
83
 Would the original understanding of the 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation–a delightfully ambiguous 
description–have extended to the right to confront children in abuse cases?  
That is a difficult question at a number of levels. It requires considering 
the more general question of whether the original understanding created an 
implied right of confrontation. Then the particular issues associated with 
child abuse cases, hardly common in the Eighteenth Century, and with 
child witnesses in the Eighteenth Century, again hardly common, must be 
considered. The implication is neither as simple nor as obvious as Justice 
Scalia’s language might suggest.84 This example is important because it 
 
 
 82. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 840–42 Witnesses were identified and subject to cross-examination, 
but were permitted to testify by closed circuit television without violation. There is no suggestion that 
this was an example of technological change properly taken into account in interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. Admittedly, the majority opinion reflected the same confusion or, at least, conflation 
between confronting, and being confronted by. 
 83. Justice Scalia recognizes this, although he thinks it not relevant in light of his reading of the 
constitutional command. In the face of the constitutional requirement that defendants be confronted by 
the witnesses against them, Justice Scalia believes that a calculation of the social costs imposed by 
such a requirement on children who are victims of sexual abuse is beyond the authority of the courts. 
The trumping by the Constitution is not unlike Dworkin’s view of the trumping authority of principle 
in the face of mere policy. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING]. 
 84. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 44. Scott Soames remarks upon Justice 
Scalia’s overly simplistic account of language in Justice Scalia’s discussion of Smith v. United States, 
508 U.S. 223 (1993). See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 14, at 598–600. 
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helps to highlight the complexity of language and of meaning. I do not 
mean to assert that Justice Scalia is necessarily wrong in his interpretation. 
It may be that defendants are entitled both to be confronted with, and to 
confront, the adverse witnesses. But the latter right is not stated by the 
language of the Sixth Amendment. The more natural interpretation is the 
narrower reading suggested here. 
A second example in which linguistic ambiguity has been largely 
overlooked arises with respect to the Eighth Amendment. There, too, 
Justice Scalia has articulated his interpretative position clearly and 
strongly. In relevant part, the Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and 
unusual punishment [shall not] be inflicted.” The interpretation of that 
provision, particularly as it relates to capital punishment, has been highly 
controversial. Even so, the Eighth Amendment case law and commentary, 
as well as that debate, gloss over other sources of ambiguity in that 
provision. The interpretative challenge is more complex than the 
proponents acknowledge. The initial ambiguity is whether the prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment applies only to punishments that are both 
cruel and unusual or to all punishments that are either cruel or unusual. 
Both are possible readings of the ordinary English. A third possibility is 
that “cruel and unusual” is a term of art, with a meaning independent of 
each of the component words. Admittedly, the jurisprudence of the Eighth 
Amendment has failed to consider all of these options.
85
 Note, however, 
that if unusual punishments were to be prohibited that interpretation would 
make a hash of Justice Scalia’s historically limited interpretation. What is 
unusual varies over time, including with technological change.
86
 
As a doctrinal matter, the choice among these options is clear. Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence is substantial and well-articulated.
87
 The 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments in the Eighth Amendment is 
limited to punishments that are both cruel and unusual.
88
 If we resort to 
original meanings and focus not upon the intents with respect to 
expectations but only on linguistic intention, the question becomes far 
 
 
 85. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (approving electrocution as means of 
execution, despite novelty and, implicitly, resulting unusualness). See generally Note, The Cruel and 
Unusual Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635 (1966). 
 86. Moreover, to the extent that technological change is a permissible type of change that the 
originalists like Justice Scalia and Judge Bork would view as properly taken into account in 
constitutional interpretation, their strenuous objection to the application of the Eighth Amendment to 
capital punishment might be undermined. See generally Originalism’s Implications, Section II.C. 
 87. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14(f) (2d ed. 
1986). 
 88. Id. 
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murkier. The academic scholarship has explored the genesis of the 
language of the Eighth Amendment and there are substantial questions 
surrounding its provenance and original meaning.
89
 Why should we be 
surprised at ambiguity? 
But I want again to return to the role of implicature in Justice Scalia’s 
Eighth Amendment interpretation.
90
 He reads “cruel and unusual” as 
requiring that prohibited punishments be both cruel and unusual, or 
perhaps as a term of art.
91
 He draws from the other references to capital 
punishment in the Constitution and the social practices of the Eighteenth 
century an implication that capital punishment is not prohibited.
92
 As with 
Justice Scalia’s application of implicature to the reading of the Sixth 
Amendment, these are very plausible interpretive implications to draw. 
But it is not a reading that is supported by the meaning of the text alone, 
and there are implied arguments and inferences that underlie the 
interpretation. 
The implication that I want to draw here from Justice Scalia’s 
interpretive technique, in which he looks to the text, to the implications 
that may be drawn from the text and to the implications that may be drawn 
with respect to the text from original social practices, is that his is not a 
highly formal theory in practice. In its inferential approach it is highly 
informal.
93
 Justice Scalia’s presentation suggests that his method is more 
formal than it is, and he may indeed mistake the level of formality in what 
he does. But we should not lose sight of the powerful, informal inferences 
that underlie his interpretive method and the results that he obtains 
repeatedly in key contexts. 
 
 
 89. See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original 
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that there was no proportionality requirement between 
crimes and their punishment under the Eighth Amendment for the Founders). 
 90. I am here agnostic about the technical debates regarding Grice’s theory of implicature. Even 
the critics recognize the importance of Grice’s concept of implicature, even when they disagree about 
the precise rules that apply in natural language. See generally WAYNE A. DAVIS, IMPLICATURE: 
INTENTION, CONVENTION AND PRINCIPLE IN THE FAILURE OF GRICEAN THEORY (1998). Recognizing 
the concept and importance of implicature in explaining meaning and communication is sufficient for 
my purpose here.  
 91. As in Justice Scalia’s reading of the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause, there is no 
attention to the grammatical possibility that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and 
unusual” punishments might be interpreted as prohibiting punishments that are cruel and also 
prohibiting punishments that are unusual. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 145. The 
constitutional language alone cannot foreclose that possibility. As remarked above, Justice Scalia’s 
account of language, including the language used in the Constitution, does not acknowledge the 
sources of ambiguity and uncertainty in that language and in its use. 
 92. See id. 
 93. For example, Justice Scalia asserts that the references to capital punishment in the 
Constitution demonstrate that capital punishment cannot be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
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Originalism’s practice of interpretation is thus largely inconsistent with 
its own account of meaning and of its interpretive project. The originalists 
claim to look to the meaning of the text. While they deny looking only to 
literal meaning, they do not acknowledge the myriad techniques of 
implicature that they readily employ. The result of the use of those 
admittedly natural techniques is that the meaning that is derived is deeply 
embedded in the practices and outcome expectations of the period.
94
 No 
semantic account of the meaning of the constitutional text is adequate to 
answer the questions that arise in the course of constitutional adjudication. 
Recourse to the implications and entailments of use to answer those 
questions carries more baggage than the originalists acknowledge.
95
 In 
particular, the required use of those techniques takes the originalists 
beyond the semantic meaning of the particular constitutional text. 
Whatever the weaknesses of originalism’s account of linguistic 
meaning, its principal focus is upon determining the meaning of a single 
text, the Constitution. On first impression, originalism would appear to be 
a translation of one meaning—the original meaning—into a second 
meaning, the current meaning. For Justice Scalia, it would appear to be 
that such translation is an isomorphism, mapping all of the original 
meanings onto all of the current meanings (except for a modest subset of 
erroneous current meanings that arise out of non-originalist precedent). 
More importantly, that isomorphism is an identity relationship: the 
original meaning map. (One-to-one, onto the current meanings, subject to 
the previously noted caveat). But original meaning is a complex thing.
96
 
Various originalisms look to various original meanings. Focusing on the 
dominant originalism of original semantic understandings, those meanings 
are the publicly understood semantic meanings, the understandings of 
what words had been spoken and what they were intended to import.
97
 So 
 
 
 94. I outlined the importation of outcome expectations through the natural techniques of 
attending to implicature in Evolving Originalism. Simply, the literal text of the Constitution, without 
attention to the implications that follow from that text, cannot answer many of the questions that arise, 
nor does that text capture how the Constitution was understood, or what it was expected to do. So 
originalists like Judge Bork and Justice Scalia turn very naturally to the implicatures that flow from 
that text. In so doing, they look to outcome expectations as well as the text itself. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See generally LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 72, at sections II.A.(1) and (5). 
Important questions include whether to look to the drafters or the ratifying audience, whether to look at 
the intentions or the public understanding, and how to interpret the level of generality at which a 
provision is to be understood. 
 97. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 38. Some originalists and some critics have 
recognized that the importance of the distinction is at most modest. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Original 
Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009) 
(asserting that, as an empirical matter, the overlap necessarily approaches congruence because of the 
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the meanings of the words in the contexts in which they were used 
determine the original meaning that was understood.
98
 However, once the 
original semantic understanding has been derived, that is the meaning that 
is to be imported into the present as the current meaning of the provision, 
too. 
D. The Nature of Constitutional Argument 
It follows from the account originalism offers of the truth of 
propositions of constitutional law and the meaning of the Constitution that 
arguments about constitutional law are properly arguments about the 
meaning of constitutional provisions. Those arguments are, therefore, 
arguments about the original understanding or intentions with respect to 
the meaning of the constitutional provisions. Other claims (with the 
exception of limited arguments from precedent) are not legitimate on the 
originalist account. But originalists recognize the tension inherent in this 
description; our constitutional disputes do not feel like disputes over 
meaning. For example, while it is possible to describe Brown v. Board of 
Education as a dispute over the terms “equal” (or about the terms 
“separate” and “equal”), that dispute somehow does not capture either how 
the parties approached the argument, or what anyone thought was at stake. 
So originalists have frequently invoked a notion of illegitimate 
constitutional disagreement.  
In such illegitimate disagreements, non-originalist moral values and 
political judgments intrude, infecting the proper semantic content of 
legitimate constitutional argument. Much of the stridency of originalist 
constitutional criticism derives from the combination of substantive 
disagreement and the characterization of the basis of the argument 
expressly or implicitly made as illegitimate. Sunstein captures this 
dimension of originalism quite nicely with respect to Douglas Ginsburg.
99
 
Other originalists, including Bork and Justice Scalia write in the same 
way.
100
 The originalist account of constitutional argument is very 
 
 
nature of communication); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 
(2008) (evidence relevant for one form of originalism is largely equally relevant for the other). 
 98. The rules of syntax also play a role in this construction of meaning. See District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (disparate views as to the syntactical role and import of the initial 
clause of the Second Amendment). 
 99. SUNSTEIN, ROBES, supra note 45, at 54 (“[Judge Douglas Ginsburg] writes as if those who 
reject originalism reject the Constitution itself. They’re lawless.”). 
 100. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 39 (characterizing the non-originalists, 
Justice Scalia writes: “Never mind the text that we are supposedly construing; we will smuggle these 
new rights in, if all else fails, under the Due Process Clause (which, as I have described, is textually 
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important, but before turning to it I want to explore the originalist 
characterization of legitimate constitutional argument. 
Legitimate constitutional arguments are about the meanings of the 
constitutional provisions. They are not about whether those meanings are 
prudent, sensible, or moral.
101
 A good example is the distinction between 
the dissent by Justice Stevens
102
 and the dissent by Justice Breyer
103
 in 
Heller.
104
 Justice Stevens engaged almost exclusively on the meaning of 
the Second Amendment; Justice Breyer considered the prudence of an 
interpretation of the Second Amendment that would permit widespread 
legal ownership of handguns in the current United States, as well as the 
structural issues of overriding a decision by the District of Columbia 
democratic government. Originalists like Justice Scalia would apparently 
consider Justice Breyer’s dissent to be an impermissible argument.105 It is 
impermissible because it relies upon improper, non-originalist 
interpretations. The Stevens dissent, by contrast, was simply wrong.
106
 It 
purported to look to original understandings, but erred in its historical 
analysis.  
Originalism not only overturns much of our constitutional doctrine but 
also would exclude much of our practice of constitutional argument. 
Originalism’s account does not easily fit the facts about how constitutional 
cases are argued, or how the Constitution has evolved. Constitutional 
argument—before the courts and by the courts—ranges far afield of mere 
analysis of semantic meaning. Bobbitt’s in-depth analysis of Missouri v. 
 
 
incapable of containing them).” (emphasis added)). See also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 143. 
Judge Bork’s criticism of the legitimacy of the non-originalist position follows from his position that 
only originalism is consistent with the fundamental structure of our democratic republic. 
 101. Judge Bork is perhaps clearest on the separation of the originalist Constitution and morality, 
but that separation is evident in Justice Scalia’s rejection of natural law theory, too. See, e.g., BORK, 
TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 251–53; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45. 
 102. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). 
 103. Id. at 681 (“the protection the Amendment provides is not absolute.”). 
 104. Id. at 570. 
 105. Thus Justice Scalia writes: 
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. . . . A constitutional guarantee 
subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. 
Id. at 634. 
 106. With respect to Justice Stevens’s dissent, Justice Scalia is equally forceful, but tacitly more 
respectful of the implicit shared originalist premise of that dissent: 
Justice Stevens relies on the drafting history of the Second Amendment—the various 
proposals in the state conventions and the debates in Congress. . . . [E]ven assuming that this 
legislative history is relevant, Justice Stevens flatly misreads the historical record. 
Id. at 603. 
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Holland captures this richness.
107
 From a different perspective, Fried’s 
account of constitutional doctrine shows a complexity in constitutional 
analysis that cannot be reduced to semantic questions.
108
 
Originalism must redescribe constitutional argument in order to 
account for it within the originalist theory of interpretation. Originalism 
privileges only certain authorities. Originalism’s restriction of interpretive 
privilege to original understandings, intentions and expectations is central 
to originalism. The characterization of constitutional argument as properly 
limited to disputes about the original semantic understanding follows from 
the limited authorities that originalism recognizes. Unfortunately, such a 
redescription of constitutional disputes appears unpersuasive as a 
descriptive account. It is unpersuasive because the range of arguments 
generally accepted by the courts as relevant in constitutional adjudication 
is not limited to inquiries into semantic meanings. To the extent that this 
claim needs a defense, originalists concede the inaccuracy of their account 
as a descriptive matter; that inaccuracy simply reflects the fundamentally 
reformist thrust of originalism for our constitutional practices. The 
normative account is derivative of the argument offered for originalism 
itself. The argument for the illegitimacy of other types of established 
constitutional argument follows because those other modes of 
constitutional argument are arguments from the other types of authority. 
Because of the privilege that originalism gives to the original 
understandings, expectations, and intentions, it follows either that such 
other arguments are illegitimate (in the case of exclusive originalism) or 
weak (in the case of non-exclusive originalism). 
Constitutional arguments are, for public understanding originalists, in 
Dworkin’s term,109 semantic arguments; they are arguments about the 
meaning of provisions of the Constitution. Because the relevant meanings 
are historical meanings, those semantic arguments are about historical 
semantics.
110
 Even for original expectations or original intent originalists, 
the focus is at most broadened to include pragmatics.
111
 Such originalists 
 
 
 107. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See generally BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at 48–63. 
 108. See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 42 (2004) [hereinafter FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS] (describing constitutional doctrine). 
 109. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–46 (1986) (describing the so-called semantic 
sting) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE]. 
 110. It is for this reason that recourse to historical dictionary meanings is so prevalent. See, e.g., 
RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 209–12 (2006). 
 111. Some sense of pragmatics, the context in which a proposition appears, would appear 
implicated by Justice Scalia’s claim that in constitutional interpretation, context is all. See SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 37. 
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consider what was expected to be accomplished by the constitutional 
utterance. For all originalists, the source of the constitutional dispute 
would appear to be language, and the proper focus for the resolution of 
such controversies would appear to fall on the language of the original 
text.
112
 That characterization of constitutional disputes and the relevant 
arguments that should be deployed accurately describes much 
constitutional argument and decision by originalists.
113
 But it leaves open 
what to make of those disputes for which there is no apparent answer as to 
the original understanding, expectations, or intentions. 
Originalists appear to differ as to the nature of those arguments where 
there is no answer to the choice of original readings. Bork argues that the 
constitutional text falls away in that case, as if obscured by an inkblot.
114
 
Most originalists are not so radical, however, reverting to other modes of 
argument to resolve such cases.
115
 Barnett, for example, would look to the 
natural law of the founders, for example, to provide arguments for the 
resolution of such hard questions.
116
 
E. Natural Law Originalism 
Natural law originalism warrants a brief separate analysis of its 
ontology and philosophy of language. Natural law originalism carries its 
philosophical commitments openly. Justice Thomas and Randy Barnett 
provide perhaps the clearest statements of natural law originalism.
117
 
Natural law originalism appears paradoxical. There is an obvious inherent 
tension between a theory of law that does not reduce law to positive law 
 
 
 112. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (addressing the original 
understanding of the Second Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) 
(addressing the original understanding of the Second Amendment and of the Fourteenth Amendment 
with respect to the incorporation of the rights under the Bill of Rights against the states). 
 113. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 114. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 166. 
 115. It is for his willingness to consider such other forms of argument that Justice Scalia 
characterizes himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist. See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra 
note 24, at 864 (acknowledging that a penal statute prescribing flogging would today properly be 
struck down as violating the Eighth Amendment). See also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 
139–40 (acknowledging his acceptance of non-originalist precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis 
as a pragmatic exception to his originalism). 
 116. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 13, at 54–60. 
 117. See id.; Clarence I. Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution: The Declaration 
of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983 (1987) [hereinafter Thomas, Plain 
Reading]. See also SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1996) [hereinafter GERBER, DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE].  
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and a theory of constitutional interpretation that privileges the original 
understanding or intentions with respect to texts.
118
 
Defining natural law is not uncontroversial,
119
 but for our purposes, 
natural law asserts that law is based upon, derived from, and legitimated 
by, the requirements of morality that are themselves conceived as 
instrumental for securing or enhancing human flourishing.
120
 Robert 
George argues that natural law operates at a different conceptual and 
functional level than positive law.
121
 Positive law is the specification of the 
more general, or conceptual, requirements of natural law.
122
 Functionally, 
positive law chooses an arbitrary or conventional specification that 
instantiates the conceptual command of natural law.
123
 Natural law does 
not command us to drive the right or left hand side of the road. But it does 
require that we value health and life and arrange our affairs in a manner 
that protects them. Accordingly, when we create roads, and particularly as 
we come to employ mechanical means of locomotion, natural law would 
 
 
 118. In the words of Randy Barnett, “A natural law, whatever that might be . . . seems hardly 
worth the paper it isn’t written on.” RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 4 (1998). In light of the apparent consensus among intellectual historians of the early 
American republic that most of the drafters and ratifiers would have subscribed to a theory of natural 
law and natural rights, it may also appear paradoxical that natural law originalism is not the canonical 
form of originalism, and is instead a minority strand. See, e.g., Michael P. Zuckert, Founder of the 
Natural Rights Republic, in THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE POLITICS OF NATURE 11 (Thomas S. 
Engeman ed., 2000); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967) (emphasizing the role of classical republican thinking as well as natural rights theory in the 
political philosophy of the Founding Generation); CARL BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932); but see GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: 
JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978) (arguing for the greater influence of Francis 
Hutcheson and other Scottish philosophers rather than Locke); see also GERBER, DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 117. 
 119. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, Natural Law and Human Nature, in IN DEFENSE OF 
NATURAL LAW 83 (1999) [hereinafter GEORGE, NATURAL LAW] (exploring the necessity of grounding 
natural law in human nature). 
 120. See generally GEORGE, Human Flourishing as a Criterion of Morality: A Critique of Perry’s 
Naturalism, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 119, at 259, 264–66 (arguing that the concept of flourishing 
provides a metric by which to compare and rank alternative or competing human projects); but see 
GILBERT HARMAN, Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty, in EXPLAINING VALUE AND OTHER 
ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 151 (2000) [hereinafter HARMAN, EXPLAINING VALUE] (arguing that 
such concepts of human good are inadequate to support moral theory because we cannot define human 
flourishing with sufficient precision and with sufficient consensus to identify the moral rules that 
would support such a result). Classically, natural law was purported to be derived from nature and 
natural laws. See, e.g., GEORGE, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 119, 
at 83; GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 119, at 102.  
 121. GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 119, at 110–11. 
 122. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 281–86 (1980) 
[hereinafter FINNIS, NATURAL LAW]; GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in NATURAL LAW, 
supra note 119, at 108–11. 
 123. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 122, at 284–85. 
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require that we adopt a convention, reinforced by law, of driving on either 
the right or left hand side of the road to avoid the confusion, delay, and 
injuries that would arise in the absence of such a convention. The legal 
specification of the side of the road on which to drive is thus consistent 
with natural law grounded on a concept of human flourishing, at least for 
natural law theorists. Some natural law translates more directly into 
positive law, of course, as in the case of prohibitions on murder. It is not 
clear that there are elements of constitutional law that relate so directly to 
natural law. The requirement of attaining a minimum age in order to run 
for Congress or the presidency, and the twenty-dollars clause, for example, 
would not appear to be directly derived from natural law. But to the extent 
that the Constitution creates a democratic federal government that makes 
provision for the protection of the natural rights of individuals, it may be 
derived from the requirements of natural law according to natural law 
theorists. Thus, while such positive constitutional law is not determinately 
required by natural law, under modern natural law theory it is nevertheless 
valid if and to the extent it is consistent with a determination 
implementing such natural law.
124
 
Justice Thomas, the clearest example of a natural law proponent on the 
bench, incorporates natural law into his originalism because he views the 
natural law prism as the best theoretical framework within which to 
analyze the understandings and intentions of the constitutional text. That is 
in part because he reads the Constitution as almost in pari materia with the 
Declaration of Independence.
125
 To strip the interpretative theory of a 
natural law dimension would, on Justice Thomas’s published view, forfeit 
an important source of constitutional meaning.
126
 But the meaning he 
seeks is the original meaning of the provisions of the constitutional text. 
Natural law’s Constitution may be understood as a positive instantiation of 
the natural law, a determinatio in the classical lexicon of natural law.
127
 
What is somewhat problematical in such a characterization, however, is 
the extent to which the Constitution is expressed in broad, normative 
terms. It is more difficult to interpret certain provisions as merely 
 
 
 124. GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 119, at 108. 
 125. See Thomas, Plain Reading, supra note 117; see also Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law 
Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 63 (1989) [hereinafter Thomas, Higher Law]. 
 126. See Thomas, Plain Reading, supra note 117, at 985 (arguing that recourse to the natural 
principles of the Declaration of Independence avoids the “sideshows” of states’ rights interpretative 
approaches). 
 127. See generally FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 122, at 281–86; GEORGE, Natural Law and 
Positive Law, in NATURAL LAW, supra note 119, at 108–11. 
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specifications. For example, when the Constitution provides that citizens 
are entitled to the equal protection of the law,
128
 unless that statement of 
positive law is also taken as a statement of natural law, it must be 
characterized as a specification of the natural law. The difficulty arises 
because the abstraction with which the constitutional directive is stated 
appears more like a statement of the natural law than a determinatio or 
specification of that law. If that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
at once positive and natural law, then it would appear to be valid only 
insofar as it correctly states the natural law. 
In natural law originalism, the truth of propositions of constitutional 
law would appear to depend upon whether that law was characterized as 
positive or natural law. In general, it would appear that much of the 
Constitution, like the balance of our law, is best characterized as positive 
law. In that case, the truth of propositions of constitutional law would be 
determined by their correspondence with the text of the Constitution.
129
 
The more fundamental elements of natural law would not appear to be 
textual, of course.
130
 They are true because of the nature of man and of the 
world, generally.
131
 Thus, for natural law originalism, the truth of 
propositions of constitutional law is determined by constitutional text and 
natural law, depending upon the nature of the law expressed by the 
particular constitutional provision in question.
132
 One example of the 
interaction of positive and natural law arises with respect to the natural law 
precepts articulated by the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble 
to the Constitution. Traditional positivist originalism rejects an 
authoritative status for such texts.
133
 Natural law originalists like Justice 
Thomas and Barnett regard texts like the Declaration of Independence as 
interpretively authoritative, along with the Preamble to the Constitution. In 
 
 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 129. This claim is neither as obvious nor as uncontroversial as might appear. Some natural law 
theorists appear to argue that the truth of propositions of law is determined only by the positive law 
which may vary from the natural law. See, e.g., GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in NATURAL 
LAW, supra note 119, at 102, 110. 
 130. Instead they are discovered by the application of practical reason, not unlike natural laws. It 
is thus reason, not history, that establishes natural law. 
 131. They are made true by the nature of the world, and their very existence is a matter of the 
nature of that external world. 
 132. Thus, for Justice Thomas, the truth of a proposition of natural rights would appear to 
determine the truth of proposition about the scope of the privileges and immunities clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See text infra notes 152–64. 
 133. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 136 (contrasting the aspirational 
language and substance of the Declaration of Independence with the prosaic language and positive law 
of the Constitution, and arguing from that difference that the principles of the Declaration ought not to 
be taken into account in the interpretation of the Constitution). 
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those texts they find express statements of the theory of natural rights that 
they argue should be incorporated in the interpretation of the original 
understanding and intentions with respect to the constitutional text. 
Nevertheless, those natural law texts are authoritative only as interpretive 
aids in the interpretation of the constitutional text. 
Justice Thomas appears to equivocate when he addresses how he would 
use such natural law theory.
134
 Sometimes he characterizes the natural law 
theory of the original relevant actors as giving us the principles with which 
to read and interpret the Constitution: “[t]he first principles of equality and 
liberty should inspire our political and constitutional thinking.”135 
Elsewhere he puts the point more directly: 
Rather than being a justification of the worst type of judicial 
activism, higher law is the only alternative to the willfulness of both 
run-amok majorities and run-amok judges.
136
 
What Justice Thomas means by “inspire” and by his direct appeal to 
higher law appears to be that the principles of natural law should be read 
into the textual interpretation of the Constitution.
137
 With such principles, 
including in particular the principle of equality, the alleged errors of both 
Plessy and Brown would be avoided. Similarly, invoking the principle of 
liberty can assist in the interpretation of the Constitution, including the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
138
 
Natural law’s account of meaning is generally based upon a classical 
representational account of language.
139
 Under that theory, the meaning of 
words arises from the representation of the world by such words.
140
 Words 
 
 
 134. See Thomas, Plain Reading, supra note 117, at 985 (“‘the jurisprudence of original intention’ 
cannot be understood as sympathetic with the Dred Scott reasoning, if we regard the ‘original 
intention’ of the Constitution to be the fulfillment of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.”); 
Thomas, Higher Law, supra note 125; Justice Thomas appeared to distance himself from such an 
approach in his confirmation hearings. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1991) (“I don’t see a role for the use of natural law in 
constitutional adjudication.”), available at https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/one_item_ 
and_teasers/Supreme_Court_Nomination_Hearings.htm. 
 135. Thomas, Plain Reading, supra note 117, at 995. 
 136. Thomas, Higher Law, supra note 125, at 64. 
 137. Thomas, Plain Reading, supra note 117, at 991–92 (endorsing the Justice Harlan’s theory of 
a color blind Constitution and criticizing the reliance upon a finding of psychological and sociological 
harm arising from racial discrimination as the stated rationale for Brown). 
 138. See Thomas, Higher Law, supra note 125, at 66–67. 
 139. See generally Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
277, 286 (1985) [hereinafter Moore, Interpretation] (interpretive theory based upon real moral values, 
not mere social practices or conventions). 
 140. Id. at 300–01. 
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generally correspond to things in the world.
141
 On this theory, there is a 
fact of the matter about the Constitution in the world, and what we say 
about the Constitution refers to that objective Constitution and its 
provisions. It is a very commonsensical and intuitive account of linguistic 
meaning, and an account by no means confined to natural law 
originalism.
142
 Indeed, the notion that the truth of propositions is 
determined by their meaning and the world is sometimes referred to as the 
meaning-truth platitude.
143
 Such an account, classically, is an account of 
the truth of declarative propositions.
144
 While propositions about the 
Constitution may appear to be of that nature, the provisions of the 
Constitution are themselves manifestly not declarative propositions.
145
 It 
may be questioned whether propositions stating interpretations of the 
Constitution are themselves declarative or not. If not, the force of the 
meaning-truth platitude may be diminished or lost. 
For natural law originalists, constitutional controversies are not 
reducible to semantic questions.
146
 That is because such controversies 
must address what the natural law is, and that law is not reducible to 
semantics because it makes substantive claims about real moral values.
147
 
Such disputes are substantive disputes about the substantive natural law. 
The arguments that natural law originalists deploy, however, are not so 
different from their positivist brethren. They, too, look to the original 
 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., id. at 341 (“people intend in their use of words like ‘death,’ ‘bird,’ ‘malice,’ or 
‘vehicle,’ to refer to kinds of things they believe really to exist in the world.”). 
 143. See Crispin Wright, Kripke’s Account of the Argument against Private Language, 81 J. PHIL. 
759 (1984). For a sophisticated example of taking the proposition that meaning is about representing 
the world, see SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 1 (2010); but see 3 RICHARD RORTY, The 
Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell’s Version of Empiricism, in TRUTH 
AND PROGRESS 138 (1998) (denying that there is any philosophically helpful way of thinking that our 
language answers to the world). 
 144. See generally J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà 
eds., 2d ed. 1962) (arguing that certain kinds of utterances may be infelicitous or unsuccessful, but not 
true or false). 
 145. This seemingly obvious claim, applicable to the Constitution as well as to all other 
authoritative statements of law, is rarely noted or its implications explored. But see Charles Fried, On 
Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1026–28, 1041–43 (2011) (distinguishing statements of 
historical facts from statements of legal and constitutional judgments). 
 146. For example, for a natural law originalist, the question of what rights are retained by the 
people under the Ninth Amendment is not a question of the semantic meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, but a question of the scope of natural rights retained under our federal democratic 
republic. 
 147. The natural law has a substantive content, and disputes may arise with respect to that content. 
Thus, for example, there may be a substantive dispute whether slavery is permissible, or whether 
intermarriage between persons of different races may be prohibited by the state. Those are not aptly 
described as semantic disputes. 
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understanding of the text, but in so doing, they take into account the 
natural law context that the original actors shared in adopting such texts. It 
is helpful to highlight some examples in which those different approaches 
have yielded the same result, and instances in which natural law 
originalism appears to support a different outcome. One of the simplest 
ways to do this is to look at the relatively infrequent constitutional cases in 
which Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed.
148
 
When Justice Thomas invokes natural law to reach a different result or 
to challenge Justice Scalia’s originalism as facile or simplistic, he is often 
pursuing one of several strategies. First, Justice Thomas is more skeptical 
of precedent that cannot be supported on a natural law originalist 
interpretation. Thus, for example, Justice Thomas appears prepared to 
overturn the Slaughter House Cases
149
 as adopting too narrow and crabbed 
a reading of the concept of privileges and immunities protected under the 
Constitution.
150
 Similarly, Justice Thomas has indicated that he is prepared 
to reverse settled precedents on the scope of the condemnation power 
permitted under the Fifth Amendment.
151
 
Second, and more importantly, Justice Thomas relies upon a theory of 
natural law to inform his analysis of the structure of the Constitution and 
the rights protected by it. McDonald v. Chicago
152
 presented an example 
of such a use. Decided two years after Heller struck down a restrictive gun 
control ordinance of the District of Columbia, McDonald considered the 
constitutionality of a similar ordinance enacted by the City of Chicago, 
Illinois. Thus, the McDonald Court had to consider whether the provisions 
of the Second Amendment applied against the states and their 
instrumentalities. In an opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by 
Justice Scalia, the Court held that the requirements of due process on the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the protection of the Second 
Amendment,
153
 thus invalidating the City of Chicago’s ordinance.154 The 
 
 
 148. See also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006) (criticizing Justice Scalia as neither endorsing nor defending the 
implications of his originalism). 
 149. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 150. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 151. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 152. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 153. Id. at 778 (“In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty.”). 
 154. Id. at 790. 
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Court’s reasoning thus relied on a traditional application of the doctrine of 
substantive due process to a case of first impression.
155
 
Justice Thomas concurred in the result, but declined to join key parts of 
the Court’s opinion.156 In particular, by declining to join parts IV and V of 
the Court’s opinion (in which Justice Scalia also concurred), Justice 
Thomas repudiated the substantive due process argument of the Court.
157
 
Instead, Justice Thomas proposed to protect the Second Amendment rights 
of the petitioners by implicitly overruling over a century of Fourteenth 
Amendment precedent
158
 and finding those rights protected as privileges 
and immunities of citizens, protected under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
159
 In so doing, Justice Thomas 
stood the reasoning of the Slaughter House Cases on their head.
160
 That 
case, after all, held that pre-existing rights that arose under natural law 
were not within the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
161
 He did so on two grounds. Justice Thomas’s 
principal argument was based upon natural law.
162
 Justice Thomas 
proposed to read the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by reference 
to natural law.
163
 While that amendment spoke literally in terms of 
“privileges and immunities” Justice Thomas argued that it would have 
been originally understood to have encompassed rights as well.
164
 Thus, in 
 
 
 155. It was novel because the rights protected by the Second Amendment presented a case of first 
impression, but the analysis of whether such rights were incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and protected against the States employed by the Court was the classic inquiry into whether such rights 
were fundamental. 
 156. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Justice Thomas’s opinion elicited an 
almost hysterical reaction in parts of the academy. See, e.g., Incorporation of the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms, 124 HARV. L. REV. 229, 239 (“Before assuming office, judges take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution—it will be a sad day for liberty and law if we can no longer take seriously any judge who 
means it.”). 
 157. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree that [the right to keep 
and bear arms protected by the Second Amendment] is enforceable against the States through a Clause 
that speaks only to ‘process.’”). 
 158. Expressly limited, or overruled, in this context, would be the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
36 (1873) and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 159. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 812–19, 821–35 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 160. That case concluded that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States did 
not include the rights of a citizen as a citizen of a state. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78–79. The 
Court reached that conclusion even while implicitly relying on a natural law theory of citizens’ rights. 
Justice Thomas would use natural law theory as the measure of the privileges and immunities 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 161. Id. at 76 (citing classical natural law reasoning of Corfield v. Coryell articulating the 
fundamental rights under natural law that are protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 162. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 812–23 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 852–55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (leaving open the question whether unenumerated 
rights are incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 164. Id. at 812–14 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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McDonald, natural law is employed to derive a fundamentally different 
approach to a classic problem of modern constitutional law, and a 
fundamentally different rationale for striking down the ordinance in that 
case. 
Natural law originalism thus highlights the limitations imposed upon 
the context taken into account in determining constitutional meaning by 
positivist originalism. Positivist originalism must disregard the moral and 
philosophical premises of the relevant original actors, even with respect to 
the constitutional provisions that are written in abstract, principled terms. 
Positivist originalism imposes its own positivist premises on the 
articulation and interpretation of original understandings, intentions and 
expectations. Natural law originalism is a plausible form of originalism, as 
Justice Thomas and others
165
 have demonstrated. But there is a real tension 
between natural law and the fundamental claims of originalism. Natural 
law originalism purports to harmonize the demands of natural law with 
positive law through the concept of specification or determinatio. That 
harmonization is not easy with respect to the constitutional provisions that 
speak in broad, principled terms. Finally, perhaps most startling of all is 
the degree to which natural law originalism results in constitutional 
interpretation similar to that of classical positivist originalism. 
Natural law originalism is a natural law theory, relying expressly upon 
philosophical premises.
166
 Those premises identify the sources of law, 
however, and natural law originalism may not as apparently rely upon 
ontological and linguistic commitments. Natural law originalism is 
committed, however, to an objective constitution. That Constitution is 
derivative of the natural law grounded in nature.
167
 Moreover, for natural 
law originalism the truth of propositions of that constitutional law is 
determined by the relationship of such propositions to that natural 
world.
168
 Thus, while the content of natural law originalism’s Constitution 
differs from the Constitution of positive law originalism (although 
substantively much less than we might have anticipated),
169
 its underlying 
 
 
 165. See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 13; GERBER, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 
117. 
 166. See generally, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 13. 
 167. See Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: 
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 31 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
 168. See Jeffrey Stout, Truth, Natural Law, and Ethical Theory, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: 
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS, supra note 167, at 71, 76–77. 
 169. Given the intensity and perceived importance of the Hart-Fuller debate in the mid-twentieth 
century, we might have anticipated more substantial substantive differences between natural and 
positive originalist constitutional law. 
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ontological and other linguistic philosophical commitments are largely the 
same. 
F. The Implications of Originalism’s Philosophical Commitments 
Originalists are committed to the existence of the Constitution and 
constitutional law independent of what we argue and say about that law.
170
 
They are committed to the existence of such an objective Constitution, and 
the project of constitutional adjudication is principally a matter of 
interpreting that Constitution and applying it to the facts at hand. The 
objective Constitution is the touchstone to which they appeal in the 
argument that the “Lost” Constitution is to be restored and in criticizing 
the constitutional jurisprudence of their non-originalist critics.
171
 
Accordingly, if there is a disagreement as to the proper interpretation or 
application of the Constitution, it is a question about that objective 
Constitution as to which there will be, at least generally, a single correct 
answer. The commitment to that objective, external existence is what 
supports the originalists’ radical critique of current constitutional law. 
They can reject our established practices of interpretation and construction 
by appealing to that objective Lost Constitution.
172
 This ontological 
commitment shapes the originalist approach to the debate. It grounds the 
originalist confidence that their critics are not merely mistaken; they are 
lawless, as Sunstein has pointed out.
173
 Many of originalism’s critics share 
this same ontological commitment, although the Constitution they 
articulate is radically different. Natural law originalism carries the same 
ontological commitments, but grounds the objective existence of the 
Constitution in natural law. The source and legitimacy of the Constitution 
is natural law 
One particularly important and controversial claim flows from the 
originalist account of meaning. Originalism claims to solve the purported 
problem of determining the level of generality at which a constitutional 
provision speaks.
174
 Tribe challenges the originalist project, and, 
 
 
 170. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 176; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 37–
41 (implicitly assuming that there is a constitutional text whose meaning can be ascertained and 
applied in adjudication). 
 171. See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 13. 
 172. See, e.g., id., at 354–57. 
 173. See SUNSTEIN, ROBES, supra note 45, at 54. 
 174. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 135 (arguing that context may be taken into 
account to disarm Tribe’s challenge that the level of generality at which a constitutional provision is to 
be interpreted is indeterminate).  
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implicitly, its account of constitutional meaning, based upon what he 
characterizes as the problem of the level of generality in constitutional 
statement. According to Tribe uncertainty as to level of generality or 
particularity is inherent in the natural language formulations of the 
Constitution.
175
 Thus, a provision may state a particular rule or an abstract 
principle. According to Tribe, determining the better reading is a complex, 
ad hoc task that cannot be accomplished under the principles of 
originalism.
176
 
Originalists generally deny that there is a problem of generality.
177
 
Under originalism, constitutional decision-making is relatively simple. An 
originalist merely extracts from the language of the relevant constitutional 
provision a governing principle that is then applied to the case at hand.
178
 
This is the methodology Judge Bork
179
 and Justice Scalia
180
 endorse, for 
example. According to originalism, therefore, there is no problem as to the 
generality of a constitutional provision; the text—together with the 
context—supplies the answer.181 The text and context supply the answer in 
the same way that they supply the answer to other interpretive questions. 
On the originalist view, there is nothing peculiar about the problem of 
generality. Indeed, as we have seen, the originalists are surprisingly 
unexamining in their appeal to constitutional principles and to the reading 
of constitutional synecdoches.
182
 
 
 
 175. Elsewhere Tribe reiterates his argument that the constitutional text does not have a single 
level of generality expressed in its text with the question whether there is a First Amendment law for 
Betamax video cassettes that is different from the law for VHS video cassettes. See LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 79 (1991) [hereinafter TRIBE & DORF, 
READING]. If there is such a First Amendment law of Betamax video cassettes, it is presumably 
increasingly of less importance. 
 176. Id. at 14–15. 
 177. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 134–42; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 
235–40 (endorsing Justice Scalia’s appeal to a principle of least generality to determine the scope of 
constitutional guarantees in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).  
 178. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 147–49 (the role of a judge is “to find the meaning of 
a text . . . and to apply that text to a particular situation”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 37–38 (example of the interpretation and 
application of the First Amendment to prevent censorship of private letters despite not qualifying as 
either speech or press, the only forms of expression mentioned expressly in the text). 
 181. Thus, Judge Bork writes: 
The role of a judge committed to the philosophy of original understanding is not to “choose a 
level of abstraction.” Rather, it is to find the meaning of a text—a process which includes 
finding its degree of generality, which is part of its meaning—and to apply that text to a 
particular situation. 
BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 149. 
 182. See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 38. The entire project of determining 
inherent principles or reading constitutional provisions as synecdoches opens up a degree of 
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Judge Bork and Justice Scalia acknowledge the necessity of extracting, 
constructing and unearthing the principle underlying and inherent in the 
constitutional text. They generally propose to do so based upon the 
original expectations or semantic intentions of the draftsmen and ratifiers. 
They do not acknowledge that task either to be particularly difficult or to 
require a departure from originalism. For Tribe, however, the problem of 
the appropriate level of generality to be accorded constitutional provisions 
is pervasive and difficult. Tribe’s interpretive problems appear to grow out 
of his tacit premise that the application of every constitutional rule 
requires an interpretation. For the reasons referenced above, however, that 
premise is questionable.
183
 
For Justice Scalia, it is as if he need do nothing more than read the 
provision, recognizing it either as a specific rule or as a constitutional 
synecdoche. In his account of originalism, he sometimes sounds almost 
Wittgensteinian, emphasizing that the judge does not need an 
interpretation; he simply grasps the rule.
184
 Occasionally, however, Justice 
Scalia acknowledges the need for more theory or analysis in the judicial 
interpretative exercise. In those cases he invokes one or more of three aids. 
First, of course, is to look at what the contemporaries of the provision said 
about the provision.
185
 Second, Justice Scalia sometimes seems to invoke 
not the semantic intentions with respect to the provision but the drafters’ 
and ratifiers’ expectations.186 Although Justice Scalia denies endorsing 
 
 
creativity—and loosens the tethers of interpretation and application to the text in ways that originalism 
does not defend or even, ordinarily, acknowledge. See generally LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra 
note 72, at Section II.A.(5). For an example of apparent tolerance for, and comfort with, the imputation 
of synecdoche into constitutional text, see BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 13. 
 183. See André LeDuc, Positivism, Formalism and Interpretation: Unstated Premises in the 
Debate over Originalism, Section II.C.1 (Nov. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
 184. Thus Justice Scalia writes:  
I do not suggest, mind you, that originalists always agree upon their answer. . . . But the 
originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the original meaning of the text. Often—
indeed, I dare say usually—that is easy to discern and simple to apply. 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45. Justice Scalia’s analysis does not build on 
Wittgenstein, of course, because Justice Scalia does not appear to acknowledge or perhaps even 
recognize that his casual use of concepts like that of synecdoche obscures a wide range of questions 
about linguistic meaning and use. Thus, the sophistication of the later Wittgenstein’s account of 
language is not part of Justice Scalia’s theory of constitutional interpretation. 
 185. Id. at 38 (explaining that equal weight is to be given to the writings of John Jay (who was not 
a delegate to the Constitutional Convention) in The Federalist as to James Madison (who was both a 
delegate and a principal draftsmen of the Constitution), as well as to the writings of Jefferson). 
 186. See id. at 46. Tribe remarks this tacit invocation of expectations, rather than meanings, in his 
comments. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 65–66 
[hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation]; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 125–26 (2006) 
[hereinafter DWORKIN, ROBES]. 
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such an approach, he generally fails to persuade his critics.
187
 Third, in a 
celebrated footnote to a case Justice Scalia and Tribe have each recognized 
as very instructive for these questions, Justice Scalia has proposed a least 
general statement principle to be invoked if there is uncertainty.
188
 That is, 
constitutional provisions are to be read as narrowly as possible.
189
 This 
strategy raises at least two very important questions. First, when is such a 
strategy of narrow interpretation to be invoked? Second, how is the least 
general statement to be determined? 
On its face, Justice Scalia’s account provides an answer to the question 
of when the principle of least generality is to be applied: that principle 
must be applied when there is a bona fide dispute to the meaning of a 
constitutional provision.
190
 It is important to recognize the nature of the 
dispute that is required. It must be a dispute as the original understanding 
with respect to the meaning of a provision.
191
 For the originalist, disputes 
whether to interpret the Constitution based upon such original 
understanding are not legitimate disputes. Additionally, it would appear 
that the dispute over the original understanding or intentions with respect 
to the text must be bona fide.
192
 Thus, a plausible case must be made for 
two or more interpretations. In that case, Justice Scalia has proposed to 
choose the narrower interpretation. 
The problem of articulating how the principle of least generality 
applies is more difficult, however. At least a couple of approaches might 
be articulated. The first would be an approach that looked to the breadth of 
application that a provision would have under different interpretations. 
 
 
 187. See Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 115, 120 [hereinafter 
Dworkin, Interpretation]. 
 188. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See TRIBE & 
DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 73–76. 
 189. Justice Scalia introduced this interpretive principle only in a footnote to one of his opinions. 
In that context, Justice Scalia was seeking to rebut Justice Brennan’s abstract characterization of the 
liberty interest that Justice Brennan sought to protect. Justice Scalia sought to reject that abstract 
characterization and to defend the choice of the narrower principle. Tribe and Dorf nevertheless treat 
this principle as central to Justice Scalia’s originalism. TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 
97–98, 101–04. It should be noted, however, that Justice Scalia did not restate this principle in his 
Princeton Tanner lectures, so there is at least some uncertainty as to whether this principle plays a key 
role in Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence. Moreover, as we have seen, the basic principles of originalism 
can be articulated and defended without invoking the principle of least generality. See LeDuc, 
Evolving Originalism, supra note 72 and Originalism’s Claim. 
 190. See generally Frank Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 351 
(1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Abstraction] (describing Justice Scalia’s principle of least generality 
in the context of Michael H. v. Gerald D). 
 191. See generally SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45. 
 192. Absent these constraints on the dispute, the principle of least generality would narrow the 
meaning of the Constitution in a manner that Justice Scalia clearly eschews. See id. at 38. 
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That is, the broader interpretation that applied to the greater range of 
particulars. A second, more conceptual approach would look to the 
conceptual breadth to be accorded a provision under competing 
interpretations. The latter approach would apply a classification of 
concepts, from the more general to the more particular, choosing to apply 
the concept with the least specificity. That application might not result in 
an interpretation with a narrower application in practice. While both 
approaches would appear to permit a comparison of the specificity or 
generality of potential interpretative concepts, it is not clear that either 
would produce a precise metric that would, for example, create a transitive 
ordering of concepts.
193
 Moreover, it is not clear whether it would permit 
the identification of a principle that is the upper bound of all narrower 
principles.
194
 
Judge Bork offers an express response to the argument that the 
Constitution presents an intractable problem of indeterminate generality.
195
 
Although he focuses upon the argument made by Brest, that argument is 
substantially similar to the argument made by Tribe.
196
 According to Bork, 
the text of the Constitution (and its history) provides the inputs necessary 
to determine the generality at which a constitutional text is to be 
interpreted:  
With many if not most [constitutional] textual provisions, the level 
of generality which is part of their meaning is readily apparent. . . . 
Original understanding avoids the problem of the level of generality 
in equal protection analysis by finding the level of generality that 
interpretation of the words, structure, and history of the Constitution 
fairly supports.
197
 
Thus, Bork believes that the problem of generality is a pseudo-problem 
derived from a failure to attend to the original understanding of the 
constitutional text. How, then, do “the words, structure and history” of the 
 
 
 193. A transitive ordering insures that if X is narrower than Y, and Y is narrower than Z, then X is 
narrower than Z. 
 194. Such a greatest least narrower principle would require a transitive ordering of principles by 
their scope. 
 195. See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 148–51. 
 196. Compare Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (arguing that the various positions in 
the debate over the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence are theoretically unsustainable) 
with TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 76–80 (arguing that judges must look to substantive 
values to determine the level of generality or abstraction with which to interpret and apply 
constitutional provisions, and defending the legitimacy of such an approach). 
 197. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 149–50. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
302 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:263 
 
 
 
 
Constitution provide an interpretive or other rule for determining the level 
of generality of a provision? 
Bork’s approach can be described in the context of Philip Bobbitt’s 
account of constitutional law. Although Bork does not articulate his 
methodology in those terms, he accepts only three or four of the modes of 
argument that Bobbitt identifies as the modalities of constitutional 
argument.
198
 Bork privileges only arguments from language, history, and, 
perhaps, the structure of the Constitution.
199
 If Bork is characterizing such 
arguments—or modes of argument, to be more precise—as the sources of 
interpreting generality then, at least to the extent we think we understand 
Bobbitt’s account, there is no mystery as to how the level of generality 
problem may be solved. As described more fully below, the problem of 
generality would be only one element in the interpretation and application 
of constitutional provisions. On Bobbitt's theory, the modes of argument 
he identifies provide the necessary and sufficient tools for that project of 
interpretation. But that problem is traded for an equally serious problem 
for Bork’s originalism. If originalism incorporates such additional modes 
of argument in its core to determine the original meaning of constitutional 
provisions, then to what extent is such a theory distinguishable from 
Bobbitt’s? Most simply, only three of Bobbitt’s modes of argument are 
excluded: the prudential, precedential, and ethical. Moreover, precedential 
argument is incorporated, perhaps grudgingly, into Bork’s and Justice 
Scalia’s weak originalism. So there remains, on this account, a significant 
difference between the two, albeit not quite so dramatic as may have 
initially appeared.
200
 
In conclusion, Judge Bork and Justice Scalia do not offer a persuasive 
account of a self-interpreting Constitution that can determine the level of 
generality of its provisions. In this regard originalism is vulnerable to the 
theoretical challenges that its critics make. Moreover, the view is not 
supported by originalist judges’ judicial decisions. The need for extra-
textual interpretative principles, like the principle of least generality or 
Bork’s requirement of clear statement, is a troubling, largely hidden 
 
 
 198. For Bobbitt’s exposition of his modalities of constitutional argument see generally BOBBITT, 
FATE, supra note 1. 
 199. It is not entirely clear that Bork would accept an argument from the structure of the 
Constitution. His criticism of Ely’s rejection of clause-bound interpretivism suggests that such 
structural approaches—perhaps because so closely associated with Charles Black—are likely not 
acceptable to Bork. 
 200. Moreover, having admitted structural argument into originalist interpretation, Judge Bork 
needs an account of why Bobbitt’s other three non-originalist modes of argument should be 
impermissible.  
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feature of originalism. Such extra-textual sources of law are never 
acknowledged or addressed; their existence is consistently denied.
201
 In 
order to deliver the neutrality and democratic theory consequences 
originalism advertises, this gap must be filled in a manner compatible with 
those claims.
202
 Thus, both as a theoretical matter and in the determination 
of particular constitutional questions,
203
 Justice Scalia fails to show that his 
methodology excludes extra-textual sources.  
The only strategy apparently available to Justice Scalia that would 
salvage the originalism project would be one that, while conceding that 
originalism does not answer all questions, nevertheless asserts that 
originalism answers many questions. But if this gap-filling project is to 
retain the principal claimed benefits of originalism, it must fill the gaps 
neutrally, without permitting judges’ own values to operate freely and 
without limit. This may be the sense, after all, in which Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that originalism does not eliminate (“inoculate against”) 
willfulness.
204
 It is unclear how originalism would go about filling those 
gaps. This, too, is one of the fronts on which originalism may advance the 
dialogue by acknowledging the theoretical and practical gap, and outlining 
an analysis of a response. 
It is not clear that originalism needs a response to such criticisms, 
however. First, to the extent that originalism makes a claim of non-
exclusive privilege that the original understandings or expectations are to 
be given a priority in constitutional decision, the potential gaps in the 
originalist Constitution are not particularly troubling.
205
 Second, given that 
originalism privileges the original understandings, intentions, and 
expectations, so long as such understandings, intentions, and expectations 
exist (and it is not clear that the critics’ challenges have called that 
 
 
 201. Part of the confusion arises from the focus upon the stated mission of originalism—the 
interpretation of the original meaning of the text—with the method of that interpretation which permits 
the use of extratextual sources in that interpretation, whether it be other writings or the construction of 
principles from which to infer and extend the meaning of the text. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 6, at 38. 
 202. In particular, that use of extra-textual sources must be reconciled with the claim to provide a 
theory of interpretation and adjudication that narrowly cabins judges’ discretion. 
 203. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 849–50 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 
the threat to national security that the Court’s decision creates as another prudential factor arguing 
against that decision). 
 204. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 140. 
 205. This is the approach taken, for example, by Keith Whittington in his elaboration of a 
distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction. See generally 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 37; see also Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 455 (2014). 
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existence into doubt), then originalism sets up a plausible mode of 
argument. 
The ontological and related philosophical premises underlying 
originalism also shape the originalists’ defense against their critics in more 
general ways. If there is an objective, independent Constitution and if the 
truth of propositions of constitutional law consist in such statements 
corresponding to such Constitution-in-the-world, then those premises must 
shape the debate about originalism. First, if there are such objective truths 
about our constitutional law, then argument about such objective truth 
must begin by stating the correct propositions of constitutional law that 
comprise that law. The arguments to be made in favor of such propositions 
are arguments about the objective Constitution. To the extent that there is 
disagreement, argument is not a matter of persuading a protagonist with an 
opposing position that her position is a poor choice or unsound or even 
incoherent. Rather, the argument can only be by reference to the objective 
facts about the Constitution, and why the protagonist’s position does not 
accord with the facts. That is a very constrained form of argument, and if 
the protagonists disagree about the facts about the Constitution-in-the-
world, the argument becomes very difficult, and the potential for 
persuasive arguments to be made by either side of the debate becomes 
remote. 
Finally, the theory of constitutional interpretation, meaning, and truth 
commits originalism to underlying general claims about meaning and 
truth.
206
 Truth is the correspondence of propositions about the Constitution 
with how the constitutional world is, and meaning of constitutional 
provisions arises not from the use of those provisions (that would provide 
scant foundation for the originalist restoration project) but from the 
meaning of the words and the rules of syntax and grammar.
207
 The account 
of constitutional argument derives from the limited constitutional 
authorities that originalism privileges. That limited scope commits 
originalism (except natural law originalism) to the proposition that 
constitutional disputes are disputes about semantics or about the historical 
practices that envelop those semantic understandings.
208
 Natural law 
 
 
 206. The truth of a proposition of constitutional law derives from its correspondence with the 
original understanding of or expectations with respect to the provision of the Constitution that the 
proposition speaks to. 
 207. For an application of the rules of syntax in interpretation, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (disregarding the initial clause of the Second Amendment as merely a prefatory 
clause). 
 208. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45 (acknowledging occasional potential 
disputes as to the original understanding of the Constitution). 
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originalists would deny that such constitutional disputes are semantic.
209
 
They are instead in whole or in part disputes about the substantive natural 
law.
210
 Lastly, the account of our knowledge on propositions of 
constitutional law relies upon a classical model of judges and citizens as 
language users and historians, a community that both knows how to speak, 
and knows that the ways we spoke in the past may have been different 
from how we speak today. These are non-trivial commitments, however 
plausible and intuitive they may be. 
Originalists would likely defend these largely unstated commitments 
on a variety of grounds. First, they would likely suggest that there are no 
plausible alternatives to their intuitive premises about the nature of 
reference and meaning and their appeal to the notion of an objective, 
existent Constitution.
211
 They would likely endorse the argument made by 
Dworkin that the alternative to the theory that there is no such objective 
existent Constitution is an incoherent skeptical stance.
212
 It is difficult, of 
course, to deny the existence of alternative accounts of truth and meaning, 
in light of the voluminous philosophical literature.
213
 Dworkin makes just 
such a point in his criticism of Scalia at Princeton.
214
 Nevertheless, the 
tacit account of the Constitution, truth, and meaning employed by the 
positivist originalists may appear plausible and seemingly 
commonsensical. 
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS OF ORIGINALISM’S CRITICS 
It is perhaps even more surprising that originalism’s principal critics 
are as committed to an ontologically independent Constitution and a realist 
 
 
 209. That is because the relevant interpretation of the text looks only to the original meaning. See 
id. 
 210. See supra note 147. 
 211. See generally BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 176 (denying that the Constitution is 
merely what judges say that it is). 
 212. See generally Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2. Michael Moore makes a similar point, 
citing a letter from Rorty to Sanford Levinson that he claims reveals the pragmatic incoherence of 
Rorty’s stance. See Moore, Interpretation, supra note 139, at 310 n.71 (arguing that those who reject 
realism are conceptually schizophrenic, and that their claims are not unlike the statements of the 
Cretan in the eponymous paradox). 
 213. See, e.g., JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969) 
(describing the complexity of semantics and pragmatics, building on the work of Austin); AUSTIN, 
supra note 144 (distinguishing locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, and emphasizing the 
absence of truth conditions for performative utterances); WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND 
OBJECT (1960) (challenging empiricism with a holistic account of language). 
 214. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 116 n.4. 
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account of constitutional truth as are the originalists.
215
 That is because the 
critics argue for sources of constitutional law that are not as narrowly 
circumscribed by the constitutional text. That broader definition of sources 
of constitutional law might appear more consistent with an anti-
foundational stance. As we will see, the principal critics of originalism 
share, and thus the overall originalism debate is informed by, the same 
philosophical claims tacitly held by the originalists. Moreover, the critics’ 
attack on originalism relies on those underlying commitments. 
A. Professor Dworkin’s Account of What the Constitution Is 
To establish that these philosophical premises are shared by the critics 
of originalism there is no better strategy than examining the claims of one 
of originalism’s most powerful foundationalist critics, Ronald Dworkin.216 
In light of the fundamental differences between originalism and its critics 
as to both the proper methodology of constitutional interpretation and 
decision and as to many substantive positions of constitutional law, it is 
surprising that shared philosophical premises underlie the debate over 
originalism. I will first seek to show that Dworkin shares the key 
philosophical premises that ground the originalist side of the debate. Then, 
I will show how other critics of originalism share Dworkin’s 
commitments, albeit generally less expressly. We will see that those 
philosophical premises play a corresponding role for originalism’s critics. 
Dworkin agrees with originalism on at least three premises embedded 
in the four claims identified above. First, Dworkin believes that there is an 
objective thing that is the Constitution, although he does not believe that it 
derives solely (or even primarily) from the original understanding.
217
 
 
 
 215. This analysis of the philosophical foundations of the debate over originalism will necessarily 
exclude some participants. Notably absent will be any discussion of the stance of the critical legal 
studies participants in the debate. 
 216. See Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN 
LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). The focus and much of the 
substance of this analysis draws upon Dennis Patterson’s analysis in Law and Truth. That work is 
focused generally upon theories of how legal propositions are true as well as offering Patterson’s own 
theory which builds on and generalizes Bobbitt’s account of the truth of propositions of constitutional 
law. Bobbitt believes that Dworkin’s theory has been informed by a focus on the relationship between 
truth conditions and meaning for propositions of law; that account is not entirely persuasive, but 
Patterson’s project, and his execution, advance the analysis in this area dramatically. See generally 
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 3. 
 217. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 136–38; see also Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous 
Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997) 
[hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous]. 
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Dworkin is fiercely committed to the existence of an objective world.
218
 
That objective world includes the fact of the matter not only with respect 
to facts, but also with respect to values.
219
 The existence of objective 
values is important to Dworkin; he believes that such existence offers a 
conclusive repudiation of what he regards as a seductive but incoherent 
challenge from relativists like Richard Rorty.
220
 Absent such objective 
values, the siren call of relativism would appear at least more powerful to 
Dworkin.
221
 With the objective, external world made safe, Dworkin can 
describe the project of constitutional interpretation and of adjudication as a 
matter of constructing an interpretation that best fits our Constitution, as 
construed to maximize integrity and justice.
222
  
Dworkin also believes that the meaning of constitutional provisions is a 
matter of correspondence between what is and what is said; the relevant 
statements are those interpreting the Constitution.
223
 More precisely, he 
believes that the meaning of such propositions of constitutional 
interpretation is determined by their truth conditions.
224
 That is, their 
meanings are determined by the circumstances in which they are true, and 
the circumstances in which they are false.
225
 This claim merely advances 
the meaning-truth platitude.
226
 Again, he does not believe that such 
correspondence is between the fact of the original understanding of the 
constitutional text and the propositions of constitutional law. Instead, the 
correspondence is with an interpretation that best harmonizes the positive 
doctrinal law and our fundamental moral intuitions about justice.
227
 
 
 
 218. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 36–41. 
 219. See generally id. at 37 (“Ordinary citizens think that the war in the Persian Gulf really was 
just or unjust.”). By this, Dworkin does not mean simply that such individuals are committed, 
logically, to the law of the excluded middle.  
 220. Id. at 36–41. Rorty would not characterize himself as a relativist, of course. 
 221. The objectivity of values would not appear to be a necessary element in Dworkin’s rebuttal 
of relativism. Dworkin’s rejection of what he terms Archimedean skepticism would appear to stand (to 
the extent it does) even if values are not objective. To the extent values are objective, then that 
argument has a broader import. 
 222. See Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982) (asserting 
that his theory of law as integrity may properly be characterized as a natural law theory because it 
looks to principles of morality that are a matter of the natural world, not merely a matter of positive 
law); but see FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS, supra note 107, at 242. While Fried emphasizes how 
unusual and subtle political arguments are even in constitutional argument, his emphasis on the 
primacy of doctrine also ensures that express moral arguments would be unusual. 
 223. Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 88–89. See also DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 
279–92 (describing Hercules’s methods of interpreting the Constitution). 
 224. RONALD DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (1977). 
 225. Id.  
 226. See supra note 143. 
 227. See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109. 
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I can articulate those positions expressly as follows: 
(1) The Constitution is an objective thing that provides a unique 
correct answer to all questions of constitutional law. It is composed 
of a historical text (including amendments), a historical 
understanding of that text’s semantic meaning, and an interpretation 
that draws upon that text and understanding, precedent, and a 
unifying legal and moral theory. 
(2) Propositions of constitutional law are true if and only if they 
correspond to the facts of the matter with respect to the unique 
correct interpretation of the Constitution that offers the best 
comprehensive account of the text and precedent and which 
maximizes justice and fairness. 
(3) The meaning of constitutional provisions is given by the 
interpretation of such provisions, and that interpretation is given 
meaning by a complex reasoning process that seeks to develop a 
consistent body of legal rules and principles that accords adequate 
respect both to legal precedent and our own moral intuitions. 
(4) Constitutional disagreements are not merely disagreements 
about the semantic meaning of constitutional provisions but also 
about values. 
Dworkin does not believe that we may simply reduce constitutional law to 
a series of legal rules, but, like the originalists, he asserts that there is a 
thing we call constitutional law that is independent of our talk about it, 
even as he emphasizes the claim that law is fundamentally an interpretive 
activity.
228
 
Dworkin’s claim with respect to interpretation is fundamental to his 
theory of law as integrity and to his account of what constitutional law 
is.
229
 For Dworkin, the interpretation constitutes the Constitution.
230
 Every 
application of the Constitution in adjudication requires an interpretation.
231
 
 
 
 228. See id. at 65–68. 
 229. Id. at 353–55. See generally Dennis Patterson, Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
685 (2005) (criticizing Dworkin’s emphasis on interpretation in adjudication, arguing that 
interpretation is derivative of other more fundamental practices in understanding and applying law). 
 230. See generally Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 217, at 1260 (“[W]e cannot give a text 
‘primacy’—or, indeed, any place at all—without a semantic interpretation . . . .”). When Dworkin 
refers to giving a text primacy, he would appear to mean simply that we cannot interpret a text as 
having any meaning (rather than being a random set of characters created, for example, by a primate 
without the benefit of language) without an account of that meaning. 
 231. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 353–55. 
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An interpretation takes a text or other source (such as an utterance) and 
translates or restates it in a factual and conceptual context.
232
 In so doing, 
it makes clear the inferences that support it, the implications that follow 
from it, and the evidence that speaks for it.
233
 Most importantly, the 
interpretation is normative; it must either endorse or disavow, in whole or 
in part, the purported legal or constitutional right, power, or obligation.
234
 
Interpretations for Dworkin are the granular statements that provide 
reasons for legal decisions by judges.
235
 
For Dworkin, the authoritative interpretation constitutes the 
Constitution,
236
 and that interpretation may evolve with moral progress.
237
 
Thus, Dworkin’s constitutional law includes not only more authority, but 
more kinds of authority than exist for the originalist. But Dworkin believes 
that that authority is independent of human social practice.
238
 That is the 
fundamental difference between Dworkin’s account of constitutional law 
as integrity and positivist theories of constitutional law, like originalism, 
that reduce law to a set of semantic and social practices. Dworkin and 
many positivists endorse the view that adjudication turns principally on 
interpretation and that the interpreted text exists as a matter of objective 
fact.
239
 Those practices are following the rules provided by the original 
understanding of the Constitution. In Dworkin’s constitutional law as 
integrity there is no reduction to practice but there is a reduction to a set of 
legal and ethical rules and principles. Dworkin’s law does not stand apart 
from our moral theory; moral theory is very much a part of that law, 
providing direction and, in certain hard cases, providing the dispositive 
source of the correct decision.
240
 This account of what law is, like the 
 
 
 232. See id. at 49–53. See also RORTY, Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-Dualist Account of 
Interpretation, in OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 
93. 
 233. See generally DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING, supra note 83, at 81 (describing the role of 
the implications of moral and political theory in determining the outcomes of hard legal cases). 
 234. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 64 (distinguishing interpretations of what others in the 
community understand with respect to a practice of the community from interpretations to which one, 
as a member of the community, is committed). 
 235. Id. at 87. 
 236. Id. at 356–57, 387–89 (describing how Chief Justice Marshall’s actual interpretation of the 
Court’s power of judicial review became part of our constitutional law and describing a hypothetical 
interpretative approach to decide Brown). 
 237. See generally Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 122–27. 
 238. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 37–43 (challenging relativist and skeptical 
accounts of law as incoherent). 
 239. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 65–68 (identifying the existence of social practices as 
the prerequisite to the project of interpretation); DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 12. 
 240. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 70–71 (1985) 
[hereinafter DWORKIN, Forum] (arguing that judicial review insures that fundamental moral principles 
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corresponding originalist account, shapes how we determine the meaning 
of law, the truth of propositions about that law, the nature of disputes 
about that law, and our knowledge of that law. 
Dworkin’s account of the truth of propositions of constitutional law 
appears to be either evolving or inconsistent. Sometimes he suggests a 
simple correspondence theory, sometimes a much more holistic account of 
truth. With respect to certain propositions of law, Dworkin asserts that 
truth is a matter of correspondence.
241
 It is a correspondence with facts 
about the world: the proposition that no one may drive over 55 miles an 
hour in California “could not be true if” a majority of the California state 
legislature had not voted for such a law.
242
 Not only does Dworkin endorse 
this view, but he asserts that everyone else thinks so, too.
243
 But the 
correspondence with the world that establishes the truth of propositions of 
constitutional law is not the originalists’ correspondence with the 
historical original understanding of the Constitution.
244
 The 
correspondence is between the propositions of constitutional law and that 
law as derived by Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity. But the 
correspondence relationship is apparently no different. In each case the 
linguistic expression corresponds to an objective thing—the 
Constitution—in the world. Elsewhere, however, Dworkin appears to 
abandon or supplement his correspondence account of the truth of legal 
propositions. He asserts that certain propositions of law cannot be 
established by a positivist account of social facts.
245
 But even those 
propositions are true by virtue of their correspondence with moral truths, 
positive law, and the inferences that follow from them.
246
 For example, the 
proposition that flogging is a cruel and unusual punishment, and is thus 
 
 
will be taken into account in constitutional adjudication, citing the example of the judicial decisions 
foreclosing certain forms of racial discrimination); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 262. 
 241. See id. at 4–5 (“Everyone thinks that propositions of law are true or false (or neither) in 
virtue of other, more familiar kinds of propositions . . . The proposition that no one may drive over 55 
miles an hour in California is true, most people think, because a majority of that state’s legislators said 
‘aye’ . . . .”). 
 242. Id. at 4. 
 243. Id. 
 244. It is not entirely clear whether an originalist interpretation would ever be a sufficient ground 
for a proposition of constitutional law to be true for Dworkin. I think the answer must be that it would 
not, because such a ground for a potentially true proposition of constitutional law would have to be 
backed up, as it were, by the web of deduction and inference that informs the overall theory. 
 245. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 14. 
 246. Id. (“A proposition of law is true . . . if it flows from the principles of personal and political 
morality that provide the best interpretation of the other propositions of law generally treated as true 
. . . .”). This statement is somewhat startling, at least for a philosopher, in its vagueness and 
imprecision.  
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prohibited by the Eighth Amendment cannot be derived from the original 
understanding of the relevant actors with respect to the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights, or from any positive law of the 18th century Republic. What 
makes that proposition true is the text of the Eighth Amendment coupled 
with our contemporary view of human dignity and the ethics of 
punishment by the State. 
This correspondence masks a very important element in Dworkin’s 
account of the truth of propositions of constitutional law, however, that 
arises out of his non-positivist account of law as integrity. According to 
Dworkin, fundamental claims about constitutional law often must take into 
account, and be affected and informed by, our moral choices.
247
 It follows, 
therefore, that Dworkin’s account of the truth of propositions of 
constitutional law (or something like it) must also hold for propositions of 
morality. If the two domains (the realm of propositions of law and the 
realm of moral propositions) had different truth conditions, then it would 
appear extraordinarily difficult and complex to reconcile those disparate 
truth conditions in a manner that permitted the role of inference from 
moral propositions to legal propositions required by Dworkin’s 
jurisprudence. For example, let us assume that for Dworkin’s account of 
law as integrity, for some moral proposition M and some legal proposition 
L, M entails L. If M is true, then it would appear that L is also true. If the 
truth conditions for M and L were different, then we would have an 
inconsistency. Dworkin appears to recognize this implication, embrace it, 
and defend it.
248
 According to Dworkin, propositions about morality are 
true in the same way that legal and other factual propositions are true.
249
 
Such propositions can, therefore, be invoked by Dworkin to make 
propositions about how to decide hard cases true.
250
 Such a view of 
morality is, of course, highly controversial.
251
 It is beyond the scope of this 
article to wade into this debate in any depth. It may be valuable, however, 
to note some of the principal objections to this view, because I believe that 
 
 
 247. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 365–66, 374. 
 248. See RONALD DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (1977) (equating what a proposition 
means with the truth conditions of such a proposition). 
 249. Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 134–35. See also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 27 (2011). 
 250. See generally DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING, supra note 83, at 81. 
 251. Compare HARMAN, EXPLAINING VALUE, supra note 120 (defending moral relativism but 
conceding that there is no conclusive rebuttal argument against moral absolutism) with PETER SINGER, 
PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979) (defending utilitarianism), and with BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE 
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985) (defending deontological theories of ethics). Dworkin addresses some 
of these potential challenges in Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2. 
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they certainly parallel, and may underlie, some of the originalist concerns 
with Dworkin’s project. 
Morality has often been thought a very different realm than the world 
of facts. The differences that have been identified to distinguish the moral 
or ethical realm have been various. Two indicative distinctions that 
warrant note are those attributable to David Hume and Gilbert Harman. 
Hume is celebrated for calling out the distinction between propositions 
about what is and propositions about what we ought to do.
252
 According to 
Hume, judgments or propositions about what we ought to do cannot be 
derived from what is.
253
 The implication of this fundamental separation, at 
least for Hume, was that propositions or judgments about morality were 
derived from a particular human faculty for moral judgments.
254
 Such a 
theory would appear very difficult to reconcile with an attempt to integrate 
law and morality, because it would raise the question of which faculties 
we employ in determining the truth of legal propositions.
255
 On Dworkin’s 
account, we are to employ such moral judgments in our interpretation of 
legal authorities. It would be possible, of course, to offer a composite or 
syncretic account of such reasoning, in which we employ our moral 
faculty to make the moral judgment, and then use our other rational 
faculties with respect to the legal authorities. But this would be a 
cumbersome and complex account. Of course, Dworkin does not deny that 
law and morality fall into such different realms. His strategy for 
reconciliation appears to be that while morality constitutes its own world, 
the world of law is, as it were, contiguous to that world and shares more 
features with it (and with the other evaluative realms) than with the world 
of facts. 
Harman has also sought to distinguish the moral and other worlds in 
support of his moral relativism.
256
 Harman tentatively notes that we cannot 
test our beliefs about the truth of moral propositions by testing them in the 
 
 
 252. See generally David Fate Norton, The Foundations of Morality in Hume’s Treatise, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUME 270, 304 (David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Taylor eds., 2d ed. 
2009). 
 253. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. III, § I (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d 
ed. 1978) (1740) (arguing that reason can never give us a reason to desire or choose). 
 254. Id. at bk. III, pt. III, § II. 
 255. A similar kind of distinction between propositions about morality and other propositions was 
defended by G. E. Moore. According to Moore, the ascription of the value “good” to a thing or action 
could not be restated or defined in terms of any of the natural properties of that thing or action. See G. 
E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 6–21 (1903) (defending the irreducible, indefinable nature of the good 
in moral theory). 
 256. See, e.g., GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 3–
10 (1977) (arguing that the inability to test our ethical theories experimentally constitutes a 
fundamental distinction between ethics and science) [hereinafter HARMAN, MORALITY]. 
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world; experiment is useless.
257
 Harman wants to employ this distinction 
to support his theory of moral relativism without conceding that all of our 
beliefs (and knowledge) are relative, too. But Harman concedes, 
ultimately, that he has no conclusive argument to establish the truth of 
moral relativism.
258
 If Harman is right that moral relativism ranks 
intellectually at least pari passu with moral absolutism, then where does 
that leave Dworkin’s reliance on moral theory to provide right answers to 
hard legal questions? 
Dworkin believes that he can refute critics of his ethical theory like 
Harman and thereby establish his account of the truth of legal proposition 
and, indeed, his theory of law as integrity, on a firm foundation. That is a 
heavy burden, indeed. As I have explored elsewhere,
259
 originalism 
purports to offer an interpretive methodology that is immune to the 
controversy and uncertainties enveloping ethics and morality. Dworkin’s 
account of law, and his account of the truth of legal and moral 
propositions, denies the originalists’ fears about the uncertainty of such 
moral propositions. He claims to have retained the certainty of the truth of 
legal propositions—witness his defense of the “right answer” thesis260—
while also permitting the introduction of moral theory into constitutional 
decision making. It is easy to see why the originalists, among others, 
would be dubious of such claims. 
Dworkin claims to be a more philosophically sophisticated 
constitutional theorist than the originalists he criticizes.
261
 How does that 
claimed philosophical sophistication present in his account of 
constitutional meaning?
262
 Dworkin subscribes to no Wittgensteinian or 
Kripkensteinian
263
 account of language because he appears committed to 
 
 
 257. Id. at 19 (“My conclusion is that relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis . . . that 
morality derives from an implicit agreement and that moral judgments are true or false only in relation 
to such an agreement.”). 
 258. See HARMAN, Is There a Single True Morality?, in EXPLAINING VALUE, supra note 120, at 
77. 
 259. See LeDuc, Evolving Originalism, supra note 72, at Section III. 
 260. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985) (arguing that there is indeed one right answer, even to hard legal 
questions). 
 261. See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 117 (“When we are trying to decide 
what someone meant to say, in circumstances like these . . . [i]t is a matter of complex and subtle 
philosophical argument . . . .”). 
 262. One important implication of Dworkin’s theory of meaning is his rejection of what he takes 
to be the originalist theory of meaning. But here I want only to focus upon Dworkin’s own theory. 
 263. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY 
EXPOSITION (1982); see also G. P. BAKER & P. M. S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE 
(1984) (challenging the attribution of Kripke’s skeptical argument to Wittgenstein). 
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the position that we need an interpretation of a rule or of an utterance 
before we can follow it or understand it.
264
 Like the originalists, he 
believes that we always (or at least generally) need interpretations of 
constitutional rules.
265
 His theory of law as integrity is just such an 
interpretative enterprise. As to the meanings of the provisions themselves, 
they are certainly more complex than those in the originalist world. 
Dworkin’s meanings must be interpreted for the level of generality at 
which they are to be interpreted, and the act of interpretation must often go 
beyond merely finding meanings and on to infusing the text with meaning 
like, at some level, multiple authors writing a serial novel.
266
 So while the 
task remains one properly termed interpretation, according to Dworkin, the 
scope of his mandate is broad. 
The goal of Dworkin’s theory of constitutional interpretation is very 
different from the goal of the originalist project. Dworkin’s method of 
interpretation is not a matter of determining what was originally intended 
or understood by the constitutional words. He rejects that task as 
illusory;
267
 instead, his mission is to find the best interpretation of the 
text.
268
 For Dworkin, the best interpretation of the constitutional text is that 
interpretation that maximizes justice and fairness, while preserving 
integrity.
269
 Maximizing legal justice is a particularly complex task.
270
 It is 
 
 
 264. See generally Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187; DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109. 
 265. The need for interpretation arises from a variety of sources. One is the need to specify the 
conceptions that amplify and instantiate the concepts that are captured in abstract constitutional 
provisions. More fundamentally, however, Dworkin argues that law is an interpretive activity. See 
DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 13–15. That is, it counts in favor of the truth of a proposition of 
constitutional law if and to the extent that a narrative account may be constructed that harmonizes such 
proposition of law with other accepted propositions of law but also with our moral judgments and 
intuitions. Such a narrative Dworkin terms an interpretation. Constructing, articulating, and defending 
such narratives is central to law on Dworkin’s account, because those interpretations actually 
constitute the substantive law. 
 266. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 229–38, 229 (“We can find an even more fruitful 
comparison between literature and law, therefore, by constructing an artificial genre of literature that 
we might call the chain novel.”). 
 267. DWORKIN, Forum, supra note 240, at 43–55. For Dworkin, that project is fruitless because, 
crudely, the text of the Constitution is stated in the terms of concepts, and we need the more granular, 
particular conceptions of those concepts to apply the constitutional text to the particular cases 
presented in constitutional law. 
 268. See, e.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 361–63. That best interpretation requires, 
among other things, balancing specific and general intentions with respect to the constitutional text, 
and the interpretation of the best underlying principle of the particular provision in its textual context. 
That project precludes any exclusive reliance upon historical interpretations for Dworkin. 
 269. Id. at 225. Integrity for Dworkin is a theoretical or doctrinal constraint that reflects the 
important, but not necessarily dispositive, claims of stare decisis and precedent. It appears to be a 
constraint peculiarly applicable to law, in contrast to other conceptual regimes. The integrity of a legal 
system in general or a legal interpretation in particular consists in balancing the incommensurable 
demands of justice and fairness. See generally DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 140, 171 
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not, on the one hand, to be confused with articulating a general theory of 
justice.
271
 Maximizing justice as a legal matter is a more conservative, but 
not necessarily simpler or more limited, task.
272
 The difference is that none 
of us are innocent; no one has the benefit of the original position. 
Dworkin, and his alter ego, Chief Justice Hercules, must play the ball as it 
lies, so to speak. The legitimate expectations of the community must be 
taken into account and the values, economic and emotional, of preserving 
such settled expectations must be recognized, but also limited.
273
 Hence, 
the inherent conservatism of legal justice. On the other hand, maximizing 
legal justice requires far more than a legally sophisticated reading of the 
Constitution and constitutional precedent. The demands of the general 
theory of justice get a place at the table, to be weighed and taken into 
account in the process of adjudication and interpretation.
274
 
It may be argued that Dworkin’s project is not interpretative.275 
Certainly the originalists would generally deny that Dworkin is engaged in 
legitimate constitutional interpretation.
276
 That is because Dworkin’s 
interpretative project is not confined to determining the original intentions, 
expectations, or understandings with respect to the relevant constitutional 
text. Instead, Dworkin seeks to articulate the best interpretation of the text 
itself, and in so doing, does not confine himself to the original intentions 
or understanding of the text.
277
 But Dworkin would disagree with the 
 
 
(“identifying true propositions of law is a matter of interpreting legal data constructively . . . . 
[R]efinement [of our concept of interpretation] would require a more careful analysis of other, discrete 
political values through which to understand these dimensions more thoroughly, so that we might see, 
for example, how to integrate [fit (fairness) and justification (justice)] in an overall judgment of 
interpretive superiority when they pull in opposite directions.”). 
 270. Id. at 225–26. 
 271. Id. at 177. As I will explore below, law must acknowledge the legal claims that have arisen 
under an existing legal and political system, even if the justice of that system is not clear. Transition 
issues, as it were, are entitled to more attention in the practical reasoning associated with legal justice. 
 272. Indeed, Dworkin acknowledges that his account describes only an ideal. See DWORKIN, 
EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 265 (“Hercules is useful to us just because he is more reflective and self-
conscious than any real judge need be or, given the press of work, could be.”). 
 273. Id. at 140–50. 
 274. See id. at 338 (“Hercules is not trying to reach what he believes is the best substantive result, 
but to find the best justification he can of a past legislative event.”). Although Dworkin is here focused 
on statutory interpretation his account of constitutional interpretation is no different in any relevant 
way. 
 275. Because Dworkin’s project encompasses a purposive re-interpretation of precedent and text, 
it may appear (and certainly does so appear to many originalists) to range well beyond the constraints 
of a merely interpretative strategy. 
 276. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 44–45 (generally criticizing non-originalist 
constitutional theories as faulty interpretations). 
 277. See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109. 
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characterization of his project as other than interpretive.
278
 He believes that 
the project of fashioning the best reading of a text, including the 
constitutional text, is a matter of interpretation.
279
  
Dworkin believes that he breaks fundamentally with the originalists 
(and with all other positivist accounts of law) by denying that 
constitutional disputes may be reduced to semantic disputes.
280
 Dworkin 
rejects the account of constitutional and other legal disputes as semantic 
for two principal reasons. His first reason is built on originalism’s 
description of constitutional disputes as controversies about meaning. 
According to Dworkin our constitutional disputes are not reducible to 
disputes over the meaning of legal texts. To demonstrate that proposition, 
Dworkin begins by describing the arguments that are made and the 
opinions judges write to resolve disputes.
281
 Second, in light of his theory 
of what law is and the privileged sources of legal authority, disputes about 
meaning are only a subset of the kinds of disputes over legal authorities 
that arise. Other types of dispute may arise with respect to our ethical 
intuitions. How is the freedom of expression that would permit 
pornography reconciled with the requirements that we treat each other 
with respect and recognize others’ dignity?282 Similarly, when the 
Constitution provides for equal protection of the laws, while we 
characterize disputes as about the meaning of the guarantee, that 
description is not seemingly particularly apt.
283
 Disputes about the answers 
to such questions are not semantic disputes, although one could have a go 
 
 
 278. Id. at 226 (“Law as integrity is therefore more relentlessly interpretive than either 
conventionalism or pragmatism.”). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 45–46. 
 281. Id. at 37–43. 
 282. Compare RONALD DWORKIN, Pornography and Hate, in FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL 
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 214 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW] and 
Mackinnon’s Words, in id. at 238 (defending a robust theory of free speech that encompasses 
pornography) with Catharine Mackinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1985) (advocating restricting the definition of protected speech to exclude pornography, on 
the basis of the harm that pornography causes). 
 283. For example, when we consider whether the state may prohibit persons of different races to 
marry, we are not plausibly interpreting what it means to be equal, or what means to have the equal 
protection of the laws. Rather, we would appear to be addressing a substantive set of questions about 
individual autonomy, the scope of state power, and the grounds on which the state may classify 
persons under fundamental social legislation. Why is one characterization of the dispute more 
persuasive or less? We do not think we are arguing about the meaning of words; we recognize that we 
may be arguing about what was understood, or what would be precedent, or what would have doctrinal 
fit, or what would be just—but it does not feel to the participants in the argument that it is only about 
semantics. 
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at recharacterizing such disputes as about the meaning of “freedom of 
expression” and about the meaning of “respect” and “dignity.”284 
Dworkin makes his philosophical commitments more expressly than 
the originalists, and they are at least equally important. Those 
commitments support both his criticism of originalism and his defense of 
his own position. Dworkin wants to introduce the sophistication of modern 
analytic philosophy of language into the interpretive project of 
determining the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions.285 In analyzing 
meaning and interpretation, Dworkin deploys modern philosophy of 
language to highlight the implicit allegedly primitive concepts of meaning 
that Dworkin argues underlie the originalist position.
286
 In particular, 
Dworkin suggests that modern philosophy of language demonstrates that 
language is richer and more complicated than the originalists 
acknowledge.
287
 Those performative elements in language, the important 
role of informal implicature, and the flaws in correspondence theories of 
truth all undermine the tacit philosophical assumptions of originalism. 
Dworkin thinks modern philosophy thus undercuts the originalist 
project.
288
 
But Dworkin nevertheless shares with the originalists other 
philosophical premises. In particular, Dworkin is committed to the 
existence of an objective Constitution. He is committed to a theory of the 
truth of propositions of constitutional law based upon their correspondence 
(or lack thereof) with that objective Constitution. Finally, he is committed 
 
 
 284. That characterization of the constitutional argument appears strained, however, because of 
the terms and grounds on which the debate is conducted. The argument is made in terms of the duties 
we have to each other and with respect to the nature of dignity, not the definition of “dignity.” 
Additionally, the participants in the debate do not characterize themselves as engaged in a semantic 
argument. While self-consciousness is hardly dispositive, both the terms of the debate and the self-
consciousness of the participants suggests that recharacterization of the debate as one of semantic 
understandings and intentions is difficult at best. 
 285. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 117. 
 286. Id. at 116–17. 
 287. That is the import of Dworkin’s cryptic citation of Davidson, Quine, and Grice. Id. at 117 
n.6. Thirty years later Scott Soames has offered similar criticisms of originalism’s account of 
language, without breaking with its fundamental premises. See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 14. 
 288. Id. at 117. From the philosophers that he cites, Dworkin appears to believe that such modern 
analytic philosophy undermines the originalist account by capturing the complexity of linguistic 
practices, both with respect to their semantic and pragmatic content. The simpler model of language 
incorporated into the originalist discussions of meaning are apparently the commitments that Dworkin 
believes are put at risk. But see Easterbrook, Abstraction, supra note 190, at 360 n.41 (suggesting that 
Bork’s focus on the understanding of the original community to determine the meaning of 
constitutional provisions follows the later Wittgenstein). Easterbrook’s suggestion is highly 
implausible because Bork appears to accept that words picture the world, and has no ear for the 
complexities of meaning and use. 
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to the position that the meaning of such propositions is determined by their 
truth conditions. All of these positions are shared, albeit often only tacitly, 
with the mainstream of originalism.
289
 
B. The Philosophical Commitments of Other Critics 
Other critics of originalism appear equally committed to the existence 
of the Constitution, as well as to the other philosophical premises 
attributed here to Dworkin.
290
 For example, two of the early, seminal 
criticisms of originalism by Paul Brest and Jefferson Powell,
291
 take the 
objective Constitution for granted.
292
 Powell inquired into the history of 
the original understanding of the proper role to be played by the original 
understanding of the constitutional text in constitutional decision. That 
project starts with the implicit premise that inquiring into such original 
understanding is important. More fundamentally, Powell tacitly assumes 
that such historical fact exists. The answer to Powell’s historical inquiry, 
that the original understanding was that the original understanding of the 
Constitution was not controlling for constitutional decision, is presented as 
a telling objection to the originalist position.
293
 Powell is tacitly committed 
to an objective Constitution, the meaning of which is to be interpreted and 
applied.
294
 Brest’s commitment to constitutional doctrine and precedent is 
 
 
 289. There are, admittedly, forms of originalism that might not share these premises, but the 
principal originalists have tacitly endorsed them. 
 290. This statement applies to many, but not all, critics of originalism. I explore the stance of two 
of those critics who appears to eschew Dworkin’s ontology in LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, 
supra note 23. 
 291. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 
(1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985). 
 292. For Brest, the objective constitution would appear to be the original text as it has been 
interpreted and elaborated upon by constitutional doctrine and precedent. See Brest, supra note 291, at 
234. Brest takes those precedential texts as objectively authoritative in our contemporary constitutional 
law. 
 293. Powell, supra note 291, at 948. I characterize Powell’s claim somewhat cautiously because 
literally Powell claims only that the historical evidence does not determine the legitimacy of the 
originalist claim. But the tacit premise that such an inquiry might end with such an historical inquiry 
already demonstrates Powell’s ontological commitment. 
 294. Admittedly, one could reconstruct Powell’s position without an affirmative commitment to 
an objective Constitution. Historical argument might play only a critical role. Powell could be read to 
invoke history simply to rebut the originalist project of constructing the objective, historical 
Constitution. Having refuted the originalist project on its own terms, Powell might go on to reject any 
objective Constitution and instead propose to apply the Constitution in another way. But I do not think 
that interpretation is the better reading of Powell’s argument. Powell appears committed to the claim 
that there is a right answer to constitutional questions and never questions the existence of an 
independent, objective Constitution. 
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invoked against the originalist reduction of the Constitution to the original 
understanding or expectations.
295
 
Ely’s rejection of originalism is based upon an argument that we 
cannot determine the meaning of the particular provisions of the 
Constitution without taking into account the entire structure of the 
Constitution.
296
 Ely believes, moreover, that there is an alternative.
297
 The 
interpretative method Ely endorses for the Constitution rejects Dworkin’s 
recourse to philosophy to identify fundamental values.
298
 Instead, Ely 
proposes to employ a structural argument to identify fundamental values 
inherent in the Constitution itself.
299
 In so doing, Ely is committed to the 
existence of a Constitution to which we may turn and to the truth of the 
propositions of constitutional law that he defends.
300
 Ely also reveals his 
ontological commitments when he objects to the jurisprudence of 
substantive due process.
301
 Ely does not expressly address the questions of 
how propositions of constitutional law are made true or how such 
propositions are to be made meaningful. Nevertheless, Ely seems to accept 
that questions of constitutional law are properly answered by looking to 
the entire text of the Constitution (not simply any particular clause that 
may appear relevant or controlling)
302
 and not by reference to the judicial 
decision maker’s values or preferences. Thus, Ely appears to endorse a 
traditional realist account that relies upon the existence of facts about the 
 
 
 295. Brest, supra note 291, at 234. 
 296. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18–33 
(1980) (exploring the open-ended provisions of the Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities and 
Due Process Clauses to demonstrate the difficulty if not the impossibility of interpreting such language 
on a stand-alone basis) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]. 
 297. Id. at 33. 
 298. Id. at 58. 
 299. Id. at 73–179 (defending the particular importance under the Constitution of enhancing 
democracy, preventing political entrenchment, and protecting the rights of minorities in the democratic 
process). 
 300. Thus, in criticizing clause-bound interpretivism and the importation of extra-constitutional 
values in constitutional interpretation, Ely argues not only that such methodologies are flawed, but 
implicitly assumes that because of such methodological error, he need not engage with the claims. Id. 
at 57–60 (criticizing Dworkin and the proposed reliance on philosophical theory). 
 301. Id. at 18 (“[W]e apparently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive due process’ is a 
contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel redness.’”) (citation omitted). When Ely claims that 
substantive due process is an oxymoron, he is tacitly committed to the view that the meaning of a term 
in constitutional law is determined outside our practice of constitutional argument and decision. A 
performative, anti-representational account of the Constitution can explain this apparent paradox by 
recognizing that substantive due process plays a performative role in our constitutional jurisprudence, 
filling a gap arising from the narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. That 
performative role is not tied to, or constrained by, the conceptual content that declarative, non-
performative texts may best be understood to have. 
 302. See id. at 11–41. 
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world. Ely’s use of the traditional dichotomy between facts and values 
suggests that the truth of propositions of constitutional law consists for Ely 
in the correspondence of such propositions to an objective Constitution. 
More recently, in criticizing originalism, Laurence Tribe appears 
equally committed to an objective Constitution. At first impression, 
Tribe’s metaphoric description may not appear to describe an objective 
Constitution.
303
 An invisible Constitution may not appear ontologically 
independent, but while invisible, its existence remains, and Tribe is at 
pains to emphasize its force. Moreover, to the extent that Tribe argues that 
constitutional interpretation and adjudication requires recourse to extra-
constitutional values, it may appear that Tribe has abandoned the concept 
of an ontologically independent Constitution.
304
 But for Tribe, even an 
invisible Constitution is an ontologically independent entity.
305
 Thus, 
Tribe consistently criticizes Dworkin as being unfaithful to the 
constitutional text in his approach to constitutional interpretation.
306
 
Indeed, Tribe’s criticism of the twin errors of disintegrative and hyper-
integrative constitutional interpretations is premised on a concept of a 
controlling, independent constitutional text.
307
 
Tribe’s insistence that there is a problem of generality in interpreting 
the Constitution that the text of the Constitution cannot answer may appear 
inconsistent with the claim that Tribe is committed to an ontologically 
independent Constitution. Tribe and Dorf assert: “The question [of 
interpretation] then becomes one of characterization: at what level of 
generality should the right previously protected, and the right currently 
claimed, be described?”308 Although Tribe takes Griswold as his example, 
the question is presented even more forcefully in his discussion of the First 
 
 
 303. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008) (describing the 
constitutional doctrine that is unarticulated yet shapes constitutional decision as the invisible 
constitution) [hereinafter TRIBE, INVISIBLE]; TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 112–14 
(defending the position that there are essential elements of constitutional doctrine and precedent). 
 304. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452 (1st ed. 1978) cited in ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 296, at 204 n.3. Certainly sophisticated critics have so read 
Tribe; erroneously, I think, however. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as Mirror: Tribe’s 
Constitutional Choices, 84 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1986) (criticizing Tribe for needlessly injecting his 
own values into his constitutional interpretation). 
 305. See TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 303, at 7–8 (describing the role of the invisible Constitution 
in telling us what is part of the more well-known visible Constitution, including, in particular, the 27th 
Amendment). 
 306. See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 17 (“The moment you adopt a perspective 
as open as Dworkin’s, the line between what you think the Constitution says and what you wish it 
would say becomes so tenuous that it is extraordinarily difficult, try as you might, to maintain that line 
at all.”). 
 307. See id. at 19–30. 
 308. Id. at 73–80, 97–104. See also Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 87 n.52. 
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Amendment and the separate suggestions by Justices Jackson and White 
that there “is a law . . . [of] the soundtruck” and a “law of billboards.”309 
These suggested approaches suggest that the level of generality is very 
limited, indeed. Thus, Tribe and Dorf provocatively ask: “Must there be a 
unique ‘law of compact discs’ distinct from the prior ‘law of phonograph 
records’?”310 
According to Tribe, the level of generality is never established by the 
text. It must be a matter of interpretation.
311
 A couple of examples may 
make this claim clearer. I have already introduced the question of whether 
the First Amendment applies to radio, broadcast television, hate speech, 
commercial speech, pornography, and expressive action. How one 
determines the scope of the First Amendment—and how one answers the 
question of whether to extend its protections to such types of “speech”—
will be determined, wholly or in part, by how generally the text of the First 
Amendment is stated. 
We ordinarily think it easy to recognize specific or particular linguistic 
formulae as well as general or abstract ones. Even acknowledging that 
those concepts define a spectrum rather than discrete categories, our 
confidence in our ability to distinguish the two remains. How could 
constitutional texts pose such a different and difficult interpretive task?
312
 
Tribe writes, moreover, of the need for constitutional choices.
313
 He 
concludes: “I hope my words will be understood as shorthand not for a 
conclusion . . . with which I mean . . . [not] to end debate but [instead] 
always to advance it.”314 Thus, Tribe may appear to endorse our 
constitutional law as a practice rather than our constitution as a thing. 
Tribe’s commitment to the limitations of the constitutional text, 
captured by the problem of generality, as well as his emphasis on the 
tentativeness of his conclusions, are not inconsistent with his commitment 
to an ontologically independent Constitution. Despite his emphasis on 
practice and on choice, in the end Tribe looks to the text of the 
 
 
 309. TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 79 (citation omitted). 
 310. See id. 
 311. Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 71 (“The task of deciding which provisions to treat 
as generative of constitutional principles broader or deeper than their specific terms might at first 
suggest . . . lies at the core of the interpretive enterprise.”). 
 312. Tribe’s account may be questioned, but our goal here is only to sketch Tribe’s theory and its 
relationship to the existence of an independent Constitution. 
 313. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 4 (1995) (describing the goal of the book as 
“simply to illuminate the choices involved in actually doing [constitutional law].”). 
 314. Id. at 8. 
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Constitution for much of his analysis and doctrine.
315
 In summarizing the 
principal areas of agreement with Justice Scalia, Tribe proclaims: 
that the Constitution’s written text has primacy and must be deemed 
the ultimate point of departure; that nothing irreconcilable with the 
text can properly be considered part of the Constitution; and that 
some parts of the Constitution cannot plausibly be open to 
significantly different interpretations . . . .
316
 
Tribe’s formulation leaves open a number of questions. Whether Tribe is 
committed to the independent ontological existence of the Constitution is 
not among them. While Tribe believes that the Constitution of our positive 
law is not a theoretically consistent text,
317
 he also believes that there are 
answers in the objective text. Tribe also appears committed to the premise 
that the truth of a proposition of constitutional law consists in its 
correspondence with the Constitution.
318
  
The other leading critics of originalism are also committed to the truth 
of their claims about the Constitution. Thus, despite Tribe’s flirtation with 
the notion that constitutional decision is a matter of constitutional choice, 
in the end, he defends his constitutional claims as true or correct.
319
 Thus, 
for example, in criticizing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment, he makes it clear that what is at stake is the “correct” 
interpretation of that provision.
320
 
In conclusion, originalism’s critics make a commitment to the concept 
of an objective constitution and to an account of the truth of propositions 
of constitutional law. The content of that Constitution is very different 
from the Constitution of the originalists; but its ontological status is not. 
Similarly, both sides are committed to an account of language and the 
world that allows each to characterize the debate as about the truth of 
propositions of law, and to believe that there is a fact of the matter as to 
the resolution of the debate.  
 
 
 315. Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 77. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See generally TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175. 
 318. See generally TRIBE, INVISIBLE, supra note 303; Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186; TRIBE 
& DORF, READING, supra note 175. 
 319. Tribe claims that constitutional interpretation and decision is a matter of determining the 
meaning of the constitutional text. Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 65. 
 320. Id. at 79–81. 
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C. The Implications of the Critics’ Philosophical Commitments 
Originalism’s critics’ philosophical commitments generally make their 
critical stance toward originalism possible. When Dworkin rejects the 
originalist commitment to original intentions, understandings, and 
expectations as capturing the meaning of the Constitution, he would 
substitute in its place the Constitution of Hercules. For Dworkin, that 
Constitution has an independent, objective existence.
321
 That alternative 
account, and the ontological independence of that Constitution, ground 
Dworkin’s attack on originalism. Unlike the originalists, Dworkin 
expressly invokes his philosophical claims.
322
 He argues that the 
originalist account of constitutional meaning is untenable.
323
 Originalism 
cannot answer the questions it confronts, Dworkin argues, without 
admitting arguments from moral and political theory.
324
 But those 
arguments are permissible for Dworkin; indeed, they are necessary.
325
 
That is because they are necessary to discover the objective truths of the 
Constitution.
326
 So Dworkin’s realism and commitment to the 
ontologically distinct and prior Constitution is central to his arguments 
against originalism. 
The objective Constitution appears equally central to most other critics 
of originalism in their argument against originalism. I have sketched 
Tribe’s argument for the problem of generality above.327 Tribe argues that 
Justice Scalia’s suggested principle of least specificity is fundamentally 
untenable. Tribe rejects the concept that we can create a metric for 
specificity pursuant to which we can rank interpretations and provisions as 
more or less specific.
328
 This claim seems not only counterintuitive, but 
seems to challenge the claims made across a much broader range of legal 
theory than merely those claims made by constitutional originalism.
329
 
 
 
 321. See generally Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2. 
 322. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 117–18. 
 323. Id. at 119–27. 
 324. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 359–63. 
 325. There is, after all, according to Dworkin, a single right answer to all legal and constitutional 
questions. RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 119 (1985). 
 326. For Dworkin, the judicial project is necessarily one of discovery, not construction, because of 
his philosophical realism, as much as it might appear (at least to Dworkin’s critics) that Hercules is 
constructing a constitutional interpretation rather than discovering constitutional truth. 
 327. See supra text at notes 308–10. 
 328. TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 101. 
 329. For example, if we cannot distinguish constitutional provisions of greater or lesser generality, 
how does Dworkin’s notion of distinguishing between general concepts and more specific or particular 
conceptions hang together? It may be that Dworkin’s distinction between concept and conception is 
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Legal theory generally tacitly assumes that legal rules may be stated with 
various degrees of generality or specificity and that we can tell the 
difference between statements that are more or less general than others. 
Thus, for example, in the Federal legislative context, we think that we can 
recognize special provisions of particular, rather than general, application, 
and therefore a prohibition on earmarking—the provision of spending for 
particular projects—is a coherent if politically difficult project. In the 
constitutional context, we think that we can tell the difference between 
general and specific constitutional provisions on their face, as it were. As 
noted above, the provision against quartering troops in homes, the 
guarantee of a jury trial in cases involving twenty dollars or more, and the 
requirement that the President be at least thirty-five years of age would all 
appear to be specific provisions. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause would appear to be general provisions. 
Tribe seeks to redeem his counterintuitive claim by attributing to 
originalism a need for a metric that orders provisions such that for any 
provisions, P and P1, P is more specific than P1, equally specific or less 
specific. As Tribe puts it, “[t]he absence of a single dimension of 
specificity is a pervasive problem for the tradition-bound program.”330 
This is a precision in measuring specificity that intuitions do not have. 
Does originalism need an ordering rule of such precision? 
Tribe offers an example why Justice Scalia is committed to the 
existence of such a well-ordering principle. Roe v. Wade
331
 presented the 
question whether a woman has a right to abort a fetus she is carrying. How 
does Justice Scalia’s proposal to choose the principle with the least 
generality apply in Roe? The first step may be to remark what the principle 
of least generality does not generate from Roe: the principle yields neither 
a right to exercise exclusive control over one’s own reproductive life (if 
that is not an oxymoron for a sexual species) nor a right to engage in 
intimate relationships in the manner and on the terms of one’s own 
choosing. Both principles are manifestly too broad. Note that the principle 
of least generality by rejecting such broad readings already collides with 
interpretative conclusions Tribe
332
 and Dworkin
333
 would reach. But the 
principle calls for the least general statement of the constitutional right.  
 
 
not as simple as a matter of respective generality. Another way to distinguish the two would be with 
respect to levels of specificity. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 332. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10 (2d ed. 1988). 
 333. DWORKIN, Roe in Danger, in FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 282, at 44–59. 
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While it is plausible that Griswold could be construed as a decision 
about the constitutional limits on criminal statutes that have fallen into 
desuetude,
334
 that reading cannot help with respect to abortion; anti-
abortion laws were seriously enforced at the time of Roe. Of course, that 
may be the point Justice Scalia is implicitly making: under the principle of 
least generality, what alternative constitutional principle can be drawn 
from Griswold to support the holding of Roe? The options to found such a 
least general principle would appear to be privacy, equal protection, or 
substantive due process. A principle of least generality would necessarily 
limit the majority’s legislative power in favor of the individual right of the 
woman seeking the freedom to abort. Constructing such a principle, 
however, is difficult and to the extent that it can be constructed, it would 
appear that Justice Scalia would be (or become) committed to the outcome 
of Roe. Nevertheless, even such a successful construction would not 
explain why such a limiting construction is proper.  
Tribe claims that interpretation is required for an utterance or for a text 
before it can be understood.
335
 That is the fundamental source of Tribe’s 
claim that there is an insoluble problem of generality in reading the 
Constitution. The view that an utterance or text must be interpreted before 
it can be applied, followed, or understood has been challenged in a variety 
of ways.
336
 I do not think Tribe proves his case. Tribe is in any case 
committed to the view that there is an answer in each case to the question 
of generality.
337
 He simply believes that such an answer comes from the 
Constitution, but from outside the bare constitutional text.
338
 Moreover, 
that answer comes from the Constitution, and is not merely a matter of a 
constitutional choice to be made by the courts.
339
 Tribe’s position emerges 
 
 
 334. Perhaps for Justice Scalia the principle of Griswold is that criminal statutes that are rarely 
enforced fall into desuetude and, at that point, due process bars further selective enforcement. 
 335. Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 76 (referring to “the simple but ultimately deep 
problem of self-referential regress whenever one seeks to validate, from within any text’s four corners, 
a particular method of giving that text meaning.”). 
 336. See generally KRIPKE, supra note 263; Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, 4 
MIND 278 (1895) (whimsically demonstrating that even the rules of logic cannot easily be 
demonstrated logically to be true), and discussion in André LeDuc, What Were They Thinking?: 
Reconceptualizing the Originalism Debate, Section II.B.1 (July 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript on 
file with author). 
 337. That answer must be found not in the constitutional practice but in our other sources of 
constitutional law. See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 77–79; see also TRIBE & DORF, 
READING, supra note 175, at 73–80 (describing the problem of generality). 
 338. Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 76. 
 339. That is why he objects to Dworkin’s interpretative methodology. See TRIBE & DORF, 
READING, supra note 175, at 17. 
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most clearly in his criticism, not of the originalists, but of Dworkin.
340
 
Tribe criticizes Dworkin as not being true to the textual facts.
341
 That 
criticism reveals Tribe’s commitment to the notion that there is an 
objectivity of the constitutional text that must be acknowledged—not 
simply a textual or historical mode of legitimate argument that may count 
against another legitimate mode of argument in our constitutional practice. 
He believes that objective constitution discredits Dworkin’s mode of 
argument.
342
 That delegitimization strategy is the hallmark of an appeal to 
an independent Constitution. Tribe does not think he need engage with 
Dworkin’s constitutional interpretations. Similarly, he does not think he 
need engage with the originalists like Scalia and Bork, again because their 
position is not consistent with Tribe’s objective Constitution.343 
Brian Leiter has challenged Bobbitt and Patterson’s claim that the 
debate over originalism turns on flawed, shared premises about the nature 
of language and truth.
344
 He denies Bobbitt’s claim that the debate about 
judicial review is premised on a representational account of language.
345
 
While Leiter expressly challenges only Patterson’s claims about judicial 
review, the broader claim that Patterson and Bobbitt make is that such 
shared erroneous premises underlie not just the debate about the 
legitimacy of judicial review but originalism and the place of original 
understandings, intentions, and expectations generally.
346
 The controversy 
surrounding judicial review is only a particular instance of the 
controversies flowing from the underlying philosophical premises outlined 
above. It is not clear what Leiter rejects in Bobbitt and Patterson’s 
 
 
 340. See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 175, at 17. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Tribe’s position might be defended on the basis that Dworkin’s constitutional jurisprudence 
is not, in fact, within our constitutional practice and the philosophical arguments Dworkin seeks to 
deploy are not accepted modes of argument within that practice. But that is not the basis upon which 
Tribe criticizes Dworkin. Tribe’s criticism is not that Dworkin’s argument falls outside our accepted 
constitutional practice but that Dworkin is not true to the ontologically prior Constitution. 
 343. See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 186, at 66 (arguing that Justice Scalia departs from the 
constitutional text of the Eighth Amendment by looking to the expectations of the Founders with 
respect to capital punishment). 
 344. LEITER, Quine, supra note 4, at 139. Although Leiter focuses his disagreement on whether 
Quine is properly characterized as a postmodernist, I am entirely agnostic on that question here, and 
shall ignore it. It is important to Leiter because he wants to enlist Quine on his side of the question 
whether jurisprudence can and should be naturalized, which would be inconsistent with a postmodern 
characterization. If one is skeptical of the naturalization project, it is likely a less interesting or 
important question. 
 345. Id. 
 346. See PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 3, at 151–63; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, 
at xii. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol7/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ORIGINALISM DEBATE 327 
 
 
 
 
account.
347
 Certainly one could imagine a constitutional debate about the 
role and legitimacy of judicial review without commitments to a 
representational account of language and the meaning of the Constitution. 
But Bobbitt is not denying that such a debate would be possible; he is only 
claiming that the debate that we have is grounded on a representational 
account.
348
 Bobbitt is right that the protagonists in the debate are 
committed to a representationalist account. 
Leiter may be claiming that our debate over judicial review could be 
easily rehabilitated without its representationalist foundations. Our debate 
is about the objective truth—whether the Founders contemplated judicial 
review with the scope and force that has evolved. Instead, the debate could 
engage on the merits of such review and over the constitutional virtue of 
choosing such a form of judicial review. But that would not be a 
rehabilitation of our debate; it would be the construction of a very different 
debate, and one, moreover, in which the originalists could participate only 
in a very different capacity. Such a debate would not place in controversy 
the privilege to be accorded the original understanding of judicial review, 
and that such privilege is a question of objective, historical fact. It is 
fundamental to our debate over judicial review that it purport to be 
conducted within our constitutional practice, but rely upon a reified, 
objective Constitution. The nature of our constitutional practice is that 
there is no touchstone that permits the construction of an irrefutable, 
irresistible argument on any important constitutional question. Thus, the 
premise of the countermajoritarian dilemma that we could, within our 
constitutional practice, reject judicial review is incoherent. Therein lies the 
fundamental flaw in the purported dilemma that Bobbitt has called out. 
Leiter refers to Bobbitt’s second claim only as a mistake about truth.349 
That claimed error is that the truth of propositions of constitutional law is 
a matter of correspondence with the world.
350
 Unfortunately, Leiter does 
not articulate the argument to support his claim, so we must endeavor to 
reconstruct it ourselves. Leiter simply denies that the disputants in the 
debate over originalism have the two commitments that Bobbitt attributes 
to them.
351
 One way to begin to assess Leiter’s claim would be to 
reformulate the originalism debate with each side expressly committed to 
 
 
 347. Leiter expressly addresses his criticism only to Patterson’s claim, but this is a punctilious 
distinction without a difference. LEITER, Quine, supra note 4, at 138 n.5.  
 348. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at xii. 
 349. LEITER, Quine, supra note 4, at 139 n.6. 
 350. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at xii. 
 351. LEITER, Quine, supra note 4, at 139. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
328 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 7:263 
 
 
 
 
a coherence, rather than a correspondence theory of truth. What would that 
debate look like? 
Neither side would be able to argue that the claims of the other side in 
the dispute are false because they do not correspond to the historical or 
other relevant facts about the objective Constitution. For example, the 
grounds advanced by the originalists against their critics would instead 
have to turn on our linguistic practices. The originalists would need to 
make the case that those practices and, in particular, our commitment to 
certain other propositions of constitutional law or of other matters were 
inconsistent with or, at the least, difficult to reconcile with the propositions 
of constitutional law that originalism’s critics defend. At the least, this 
would seem to describe a very different debate about originalism than we 
have. It does not necessarily follow that such a modified debate over 
originalism would commit either side to untenable claims. Before 
dismissing Leiter’s claim I will revisit Bobbitt’s claim that both sides 
share such commitments, and endeavor to construct the argument Leiter 
may have in mind. 
Leiter would be correct if Bobbitt claimed that such commitments to a 
theory of truth and a theory of language were expressly articulated by the 
originalists and their critics, because, with the exception of Dworkin, the 
participants in the debate—on either side—do not articulate any 
philosophical commitments as to the nature of truth or the nature of 
language.
352
 When the participants contest what the Constitution means 
and when they dispute whether a proposition about the meaning of the 
Constitution is true, they tacitly assume that there is an objective reality 
about the Constitution, a historical fact, that confirms or disproves their 
respective claims. Thus, for example, when Powell addressed the 
historical understanding of original intent, he treated the question at hand 
as a historical inquiry.
353
 Justice Scalia treats the questions whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty or the Sixth Amendment 
encompasses the right to confront witnesses as well as the right to be 
confronted by them as a matter of historical inquiry.
354
 That inquiry is into 
the objective fact about the Constitution, and the propositions about the 
meaning of the Constitution are thus true (or false) to the extent they 
correspond to that objective fact. 
 
 
 352. Indeed, classical originalism prides itself on eschewing such fancy philosophical analysis. 
 353. See Powell, supra note 291, at 886 (“The purpose of this Article is to examine the historical 
validity of the claim that the ‘interpretive intention’ informing the Constitution was . . .”) (emphasis 
added and footnote omitted). 
 354. SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 43–44, 144–46. 
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Leiter may reject this account of the originalism debate because he 
believes that debate could be translated into a debate about originalism 
without such philosophical commitments. On this account, Justice Scalia’s 
claims about the Sixth and Eighth Amendments could be translated from 
historical claims into claims about our practices of interpreting the 
Constitution, or claims about how we ought to interpret and construe the 
Constitution. This translation is as unsuccessful as a non-representational 
account of the debate over judicial review. Such a translation would lose 
much of the force of Justice Scalia’s claim. That translation would require 
Justice Scalia to engage, for example, Cass Sunstein on Sunstein’s own 
terms, and to confront the challenge Sunstein (like Posner before him) 
makes to originalism: Why is it better to interpret the Constitution solely 
in historical terms?
355
 Justice Scalia’s originalism derives much of its force 
not from a prudential defense, but from a claim that there is an objective 
historical reality that we are properly required to respect and follow in our 
constitutional interpretation.
356
 Stripped of that claim, if Justice Scalia 
were to acknowledge that he were engaged in an argument about how we 
ought to interpret and apply the Constitution within the same framework 
that such arguments have been conducted in the past,
357
 then he would 
need to consider arguments beyond the textual/historical inquiry into 
original understanding. That is a debate that classical originalism will not 
concede to be legitimate or proper. 
The critics’ commitment to an objective Constitution and a theory of 
the truth-value of propositions of constitutional law that tests 
correspondence with the Constitution-in-the-world may seem less clear. 
Critics like Powell, when he defends an alternative historical 
understanding of the importance of original intentions and understandings, 
and like Dworkin, when he denies the existence of an original intention or 
an original understanding,
358
 or Tribe, when he asserts the indeterminacy 
of constitutional meaning,
359
 all derive much of the force of their claims 
from an implicit appeal to the notion that they are not merely making 
 
 
 355. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005). 
 356. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 45. 
 357. This formulation is agnostic on Bobbitt’s claim of exclusivity for the six modalities of 
constitutional argument Bobbitt identifies. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the 
Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 658–63 (arguing that Bobbitt’s modalities ought to be 
refined to distinguish eleven distinct modes of constitutional argument). 
 358. See Dworkin, Arduous, supra note 217, at 1253–57 (distinguishing semantic originalism and 
expectations originalism, and the difficulties in the choice between them); see also DWORKIN, Forum, 
supra note 238, at 33. 
 359. See TRIBE & DORF, READING , supra note 175, at 73–80.  
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arguments within our practice of interpreting the Constitution, but that 
there is fact of the matter that can be determined. Similarly, when Fried 
challenges the originalists on the basis that their account leaves no place 
for the exercise of non-historical judgment on the part of an appellate court 
considering what the Constitution says and how it is to be applied (on facts 
already found at trial), he appears to cast his argument in a posture that 
presumes that there is a right answer that may be determined by the 
exercise of such faculty of judgment.
360
 Moreover, if the critics are to meet 
the originalist claims about the objective facts about the Constitution on 
their own terms, on a basis that can potentially convince the proponents of 
such positions, the critics must also purport to identify an objective 
Constitution incompatible with the originalist position. It is not clear that 
any such Leiterian translation can be made to an originalism debate 
without the representational premises Bobbitt identifies and rejects. 
Thus, while the critics of originalism dispute originalism’s claims as to 
what the Constitution means and originalism’s claims as to the proper 
interpretative methodology, they agree with the originalists that there is a 
right answer to the questions they address, and that that right answer is 
inherent in the independent, ontologically prior Constitution. The express 
or tacit commitment to that claim makes the debate over originalism 
possible as a debate over the truth of propositions of constitutional law, 
rather than a debate over the merits or wisdom of particular decisions of 
constitutional questions. 
D. Rejecting Originalism without the Support of an Objective Constitution 
Before attaching much significance to the claim that shared 
philosophical premises underlie the debate over originalism we have, it is 
important to explore a little further how such a debate might proceed in the 
absence of such premises. This is an exercise that can be undertaken by 
looking to mainstream critics of originalism who appear to reject or at 
least remain agnostic on the ontological and philosophy of language 
claims explored here. It can also be done on a more abstract basis without 
the limitations of the positions taken by particular protagonists. 
 
 
 360. See Fried, On Judgment, supra note 145 (defending an account of adjudication that focuses 
on the role of judgment and denying that such judgment can be reduced to an algorithm or other 
formal decision process). 
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Some critics of originalism do not share the ontological and linguistic 
commitments outlined above.
361
 Thus, for example, Posner appears to 
reject the notion of an objective Constitution independent of our 
constitutional practice.
362
 If our Constitution is only our constitutional 
practice, then it would not appear that there is any role for an ontologically 
independent constitutional thing. Yet Posner also rejects originalism.
363
 
Posner would thus appear to stand as a counterexample to our claim that 
the debate over originalism is grounded on the philosophical premises I 
have outlined.
364
 
Although Posner claims to endorse an account of the Constitution as no 
more than our constitutional practice, his other jurisprudential 
commitments are inconsistent with that position. Posner clearly wants to 
distance himself from parts of Rorty’s position.365 Posner may be 
distancing himself from Rorty’s politics, or from Rorty’s ontological and 
linguistic stance.
366
 But in so doing, Posner implicitly disavows the 
ontological reduction of the Constitution to practice. In his early writings 
Posner was committed to a narrow, economic functional account of law 
generally.
367
 That narrow, economic functional account of constitutional 
 
 
 361. The arguments of anti-foundational, anti-representational critics like Bobbitt and Patterson 
will not be discussed here. See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 23. 
 362. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 232 (1990) (referring, in 
passing, to the fallacy of thinking of law as a concept rather than an activity, but without any 
explanation or defense of the claim that such a characterization is erroneous) [hereinafter POSNER, 
JURISPRUDENCE]. Cass Sunstein is probably best characterized as a critic of originalism, despite his 
kind words for what he calls “soft” originalism. See Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313–15 (1995). His criticism of originalism has become more focused 
in his later work. See SUNSTEIN, ROBES, supra note 45, at 25–27. See generally SUNSTEIN, ROBES, 
supra note 45 (criticizing the originalist project as resulting in a radical, unpalatable change to our 
federal government and the elimination of important checks on the powers of the States); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Sunstein’s 
defense of minimalism and of incompletely theorized arguments may also appear better characterized 
as arguments for choices rather than arguments from truth. Choosing an incompletely theorized 
argument suggests that Sunstein is rejecting the notion that constitutional decisions are compelled by 
the applicable arguments. Yet Sunstein does appear committed to the premise that there are right 
answers to constitutional questions, and that originalism must, ultimately, be rejected because the 
constitutional answers it offers are mistaken. Moreover, Sunstein appears committed to the fact-value 
distinction of traditional empiricisms. Space does not permit a fuller exploration of Sunstein’s position 
here. 
 363. See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1990), reprinted 
in RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 237 (1995) [hereinafter Posner, Bork and Beethoven] 
(arguing that methods of constitutional interpretation, like methods of musical interpretation, must 
ultimately be defended on the basis of the merits of the results that they provide). 
 364. Our reading of Posner may be too charitable. See Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, supra 
note 7, at 1718–19. 
 365. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 362, at 384–87. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
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law accords economic facts a priority that is inconsistent with our 
constitutional practice.
368
 But in the past twenty years Posner appears to 
have abandoned some of these claims.
369
 Posner also challenges 
Dworkin’s claim that legal disputes have a single right answer.370 These 
current positions might suggest that Posner rejects the premise that the 
Constitution has an independent ontological existence, and that our 
constitutional practice must be measured against that independent 
standard. 
Despite characterizing our Constitution as a matter of our practice, 
Posner nevertheless makes similar ontological commitments to the 
existence of an objective Constitution as do the originalists.
371
 Posner’s 
empiricism trumps his pragmatist aspirations.
372
 Thus, when Posner 
challenges Bork’s originalism, he takes for granted that the inquiry is into 
a matter of fact rather than a matter of choosing within a context of highly 
structured reasons and arguments.
373
 The difference is that for Posner, the 
inquiry is instrumental, into the consequences of the alternative 
interpretations. The instrumentally most advantageous interpretation is 
correct, according to Posner.
374
 Once Posner’s decision-making 
methodology is articulated expressly, it is not clear what remains of the 
description of our constitutional law as practice. Our constitutional law 
would appear equally well described as that objective body of law that is 
understood to achieve the instrumentally most favorable outcomes.
375
 
 
 
 368. It is inconsistent, as Posner later came to recognize, because it fails to account for our 
concepts of rights and our associated rights talk. See generally POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 
362, at 374–87 (“wealth maximization . . . has nothing to say about the distribution of rights—or at 
least nothing we want to hear”). For one of the key criticisms that articulated this gap, see Jules L. 
Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic Approach to 
Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984).  
 369. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 362, at 374–92. 
 370. Id. at 197–203. 
 371. Dworkin characterizes Posner’s self-proclaimed postmodernism as a “flirtation.” Dworkin, 
Darwin’s New Bulldog, supra note 7, at 1719 n.6. 
 372. Posner’s empiricism underlies his acceptance of the assumption that there is a bright line 
between matters of fact and matters of value. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 362, at 362–74 
(defending the economic theory of law against criticism on the basis of classical empiricist premises 
and authorities). 
 373. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, supra note 363, at 1380 (“In the capacious, forward-looking 
account of interpretation that I am calling pragmatic, the social consequences of alternative 
interpretations are decisive . . . .”). 
 374. Id. at 1381–82. 
 375. Posner’s account clearly leaves a place for error; not all understandings as to what the most 
felicitous constitutional doctrines and outcomes are correct, and they may evolve over time. 
Nevertheless, at any given time, that corpus of the Constitution would appear to exist independent of 
our constitutional practice. The instrumental texts would appear decisive, and would appear to stand, 
for Posner, as a canon from which to critique our constitutional practice. 
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Despite Posner’s express description of our Constitution as a matter of 
practice, it does not appear that Posner means to deny the objective 
Constitution to which appeal may be made in our constitutional 
interpretation and application. Despite his occasional pragmatist rhetoric, 
Posner therefore does not stand as a counterexample to our claim that the 
critics have relied upon ontological and other philosophical commitments, 
shared with the originalists, to ground their side of the originalism debate. 
The debate about originalism may be reconstructed more abstractly, 
without reliance upon the underlying philosophical foundations explored 
above. In the absence of the ontological premise that there is an 
independent, objective Constitution, what would an alternative be? One 
possibility would be that the Constitution is a matter of our constitutional 
practice, and the substantive provisions of our constitutional law a matter 
of the practices within the relevant authoritative communities of our 
constitutional law.
376
 That will strike many, originalists and critics alike, as 
a frighteningly open-ended definition. It was the fear of judicial discretion, 
after all, that provided much of the impetus toward early originalism. But 
when we look at the practice of that community, and the kinds of 
arguments that are acceptable and persuasive, it appears far less open-
ended than may initially appear.
377
 In any case, if we consider what the 
debate about originalism would look like in such a world, it is immediately 
apparent that the arguments that would need to be deployed would be 
intended to persuade the other members of the authoritative constitutional 
law community, not all of whom, even today, are originalists. There would 
be no crystalline appeal to the facts of the constitutional matter that could 
prove a necessarily decisive argument. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The originalism debate rests on a handful of seemingly obvious 
philosophical premises shared by most of the protagonists on both sides of 
the debate. The philosophical commitments of both sides of the debate 
over originalism extend beyond those premises of political philosophy 
generally acknowledged. Originalism cannot claim a philosophical 
agnosticism. Nor can its critics. Originalism’s claims tacitly endorse 
philosophical theories about ontology, language, and truth. Those premises 
are neither manifestly mistaken nor manifestly correct; they are shared in 
 
 
 376. See generally PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 3; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 1. 
 377. For a defense of the claim that our constitutional practice is not reducible to matters of 
preference or to politics, see generally Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 (1989). 
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important respects, both with respect to ontology and the theory of truth, 
with many of originalism’s most fervent critics. Originalism and most of 
its critics assume or endorse an ontology in which our constitutional law is 
objective, and the goal of interpretation is to articulate that law. So when 
we disagree about that law, there is a shared assumption or express 
commitment to the claims that there is a fact of the matter with respect to 
that disagreement, and that there are accordingly right and wrong answers 
as a matter of the facts about our constitutional law.
378
 If that foundational 
premise is wrong, then our account of constitutional disagreements and 
arguments must be fundamentally revised. 
Although originalism generally eschews philosophical analysis in favor 
of appeals to common sense, implicit in the originalist canon is an account 
of the status of the Constitution and the truth of propositions of 
constitutional law. Originalism endorses a representational account of our 
language and a correspondence account of truth. Those commitments 
provide the originalists with the project of identifying and articulating an 
objective Constitution. The disagreement over the scope and authority of 
the original intentions, expectations, or understandings, therefore, is cast 
over a disagreement about that which is. Originalism’s critics, to the extent 
that they are equally committed to that representational account of 
meaning and truth, are willing and eager to join the debate on just those 
terms. 
Most of the critics of originalism share these philosophical premises 
with the originalists. Dworkin believes that there is an objective world that 
is represented by language. He claims a greater sophistication for his 
philosophy of language than that tacitly endorsed by the originalists.
379
 
The truth of propositions generally, and propositions of constitutional law 
in particular, is determined by whether they correspond with that objective 
world. The existence of that objective world, and making our propositions 
true by virtue of corresponding with that world, are critically important to 
Dworkin.
380
 Dworkin simply denies that the originalists’ propositions of 
constitutional law do so correspond.
381
 Dworkin seeks to articulate the 
propositions of constitutional law that correspond to the objective 
constitutional world. Those are the true propositions. Similarly, he 
 
 
 378. See Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 136–38. For Bobbitt’s statement of this claim, see 
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at xii. 
 379. See Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 117 n.6. 
 380. See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 186, at 36–41; Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 2. 
 381. See Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 187, at 121–22 (defending his conceptual reading of 
the Eighth Amendment). 
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believes that his account gives a better description of the actual practice of 
constitutional argument as a matter of objective fact.
382
 In particular, 
Dworkin believes that his account is better both because constitutional 
disputes cannot be reduced to semantics (or to pragmatics) and because the 
nature of constitutional arguments is inherently moral in certain cases.
383
 
For Dworkin, then, as for the originalists, the dispute over the meaning of 
the Constitution is a dispute about an objective fact. There is a right 
answer, and the debate about originalism is a debate over which of the 
competing answers obtains in fact. Without that objective Constitution to 
which the originalists and Dworkin, among other critics appeal, the debate 
cannot survive in its current form. 
More importantly for the nature and tone of the debate, the originalists 
and their critics seek to challenge the opposing position, not by persuading 
the other with respect to the merits of the constitutional decision, but by 
discrediting the arguments and interpretations offered by the opposing 
side. Each side does so by appealing to an intuitive, seemingly 
commonsensical notion of the nature of the Constitution (there, under 
glass, in the National Archives, after all) and the nature of truth for 
propositions of constitutional law. In so doing, however, each side largely 
eschews convincing, or even acknowledging the need to convince, the 
other side. The tacit account of the ontology of the Constitution and the 
nature of the language in which propositions of constitutional law are 
expressed permits the debate to be conducted as if there is a correct, 
objective answer to questions of constitutional interpretation and decision. 
Moreover, because the interpretative and decisional methodologies 
defended by the protagonists are so different and seemingly so 
inconsistent, neither side in the debate believes that it is necessary (or 
perhaps even possible) to convince the other side. The result is a barren 
assertion and free-standing defense of the results each side derives. 
Finally, it should be noted that the use to which each side puts the 
commonsensical notions that it invokes goes well beyond their ordinary 
use.
384
 Each side seeks a meta-constitutional stance from which to 
discredit the very arguments of their opponents in the debate. The 
philosophical premises at least tacitly shared by most of the participants in 
 
 
 382. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 109, at 43–44. 
 383. See generally id. at 189–91 (describing the requirement of moral theory underlying the 
concept of law as integrity). 
 384. Each side seeks to invoke those commonsensical notions to answer hard contemporary 
constitutional questions. That is a use that our ordinary notions of the Constitution or of truth do not 
have in our ordinary speech. 
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the debate over originalism make that debate possible. The importance of 
that role invites our careful inquiry into whether those premises are true—
or useful. 
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